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Abstract 
This paper provides an empirical evaluation of the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), the IMF's prime 
precautionary lending instrument since 2009 to which so far only three emerging market economies 
have subscribed: Mexico, Colombia and Poland. We consider both questions of selectivity and 
effectiveness: first, which factors explain the three FCL countries' participation in such 
arrangements? And second, to which extent have the FCL arrangements delivered on their promise 
of boosting market confidence in their respective users? Based on a probit analysis we show that 
FCL selectivity can be explained by both demand- and supply-side factors. The probability of 
participation in the FCL was greater in countries that experienced larger exchange market 
pressures prior to the creation of the instrument, that had lower bond spreads and inflation, that 
accounted for higher shares in US exports, and that exhibited a higher propensity of making political 
concessions to the US. Our estimation of the effects of the FCL employs the ‘synthetic control’ 
methodology, a novel counterfactual approach. We find evidence for some but not spectacular 
beneficial effects on sovereign bond spreads and gross capital inflows in FCL countries. Overall, 
our results suggest that any economic stigma eligible countries still attach to entry into an FCL 
arrangement is unwarranted. Conversely, the apparent link of FCL participation with US interests 
may not be conducive to overcoming political stigma. 
JEL classification: F33; F34; F55. 
Keywords:  Flexible Credit Line; IMF; global financial safety net; emerging markets; synthetic 
control. 
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1 Introduction
In recent years we have observed an intense debate on the adequacy of the so-called ‘global
financial safety net’ (GFSN), i.e., the set of instruments and mechanisms that play a role
in preventing and/or dampening the effects of financial and economic crises with important
cross-border and spill-over impact on individual countries or regions. By all standards, the
GFSN has grown significantly since the global financial crisis, both in size and diversity.
It now comprises four main components: countries’ self-accumulated international reserves,
bilateral central bank swap arrangements, regional financing arrangements (RFAs), and IMF
resources provided through various instruments. Each of those components has advantages
and disadvantages for their users in terms of the certainty of availability, speed of disburse-
ment, magnitude and duration, costs, and the conditions attached (Denbee et al., 2016;
IMF, 2016; Scheubel and Stracca, 2016). Most agree that the GFSN remains fragmented,
due to its decentralised and uncoordinated nature, and that its coverage has important gaps,
especially for financially integrated and exposed emerging market economies.
The IMF is often seen as having a unique position within the GFSN because of its
global mandate, near-universal membership, long-term experience in crisis resolution and
pooling of funds (Fischer, 1999). Denbee et al. (2016, p. 26), for example, contend that
“. . . while swap lines and RFAs can play an important role . . . they are not a substitute for
having a strong, well resourced IMF at the centre [of the GFSN]”.1 This paper focuses on one
element of the GFSN, i.e., the IMF’s Flexible Credit Line (FCL), introduced in March 2009
as part of a larger set of reforms to the IMF lending framework. The FCL allocates large
amounts of resources to eligible countries with strong macroeconomic fundamentals and solid
policy track records on which, in case a need emerges, they can draw unconditionally and
at their own discretion. This makes the FCL the IMF’s first genuine precautionary lending
instrument, something the IMF has tried but failed to establish at least since the early 1990s.
Subscription to this new instrument has been limited however, with only Mexico, Colombia
and Poland having entered into FCL arrangements so far.
The key contribution of this paper is to bring more empirical rigour to the ongoing
discussions about the FCL on two fronts. First we address the selectivity of the FCL, i.e.,
using parsimonious probit models we aim to determine which variables explain the three
FCL countries’ participation in such arrangements. To the best of our knowledge, formal
empirical analysis of this issue is lacking; previous studies of FCL selectivity have been
exclusively narrative. Second, we measure the effectiveness of the FCL, i.e., the extent to
which the arrangements have delivered on their promise of boosting market confidence in the
participating countries. We employ the ‘synthetic control method’, a novel counterfactual
approach pioneered by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), to evaluate the longer-term effects
of the FCL on Mexican, Colombian and Polish sovereign bond spreads and gross capital
inflows, proxies of investors’ perceptions of those countries.2
1This is no consensus view, however. Some argue for a GFSN centred on central banks rather than
on the IMF. Truman (2013), for example, claims that central banks are ‘where the money is’; only they
have sufficient balance sheet elasticity to mobilise the necessary funds to counter large capital flow shocks.
Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2010) propose the IMF could operate as a ‘central bank swap clearing house’.
2Whereas we have attempted to make maximum use of the available data, it should be noted that our
empirical analysis is necessarily constrained by the limited experience of countries with the FCL, i.e., only
1
To preview our main results, we first find that FCL selectivity can be explained by both
demand- and supply-side factors. On the side of the prospective applicants we show that
exchange market pressure in the run-up to the creation of the FCL is correlated positively
with the probability of entry into an FCL arrangement. On the other hand, also lower
bond spreads, lower inflation, a higher share in US exports and a higher propensity of
making political concessions to the US (the IMF’s largest shareholder) were associated with
a greater likelihood of obtaining an FCL arrangement. Second, our counterfactual approach
to estimating the effects of the FCL on bond spreads and capital flows suggests that such
effects have been beneficial but not spectacularly so. Some of the effects we document only
became visible with a considerable lag.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a short history of the IMF’s
precautionary lending and gives further details on the respective FCL arrangements of Mex-
ico, Colombia and Poland. Section 3 starts off with a literature review on the selectivity
of the FCL and of IMF lending more generally. A second subsection presents our empirical
strategy to gauge FCL selectivity and the variables considered. A third subsection discusses
the probit estimation results. Similarly, in Section 4 we summarise the existing evidence
on FCL effectiveness, describe the synthetic control method, and apply it to our three FCL
cases. Section 5 concludes.
three countries have participated in FCL arrangements and not a single drawing has been made so far.
2
2 The IMF’s precautionary lending arrangements
2.1 A short history
IMF lending has historically been much more concerned with ‘crisis resolution’, i.e., the
provision of financing to help rectify existing balance of payment problems conditional on an
ex post adjustment programme, than with ‘crisis prevention’, i.e., making available upfront
sizeable resources that can be called upon immediately in case a stress situation would
emerge in the future (Boughton, 2000).3 Whereas the IMF’s Stand-By Arrangement (SBA),
its main non-concessional financing vehicle, was originally established in 1952 to be used
as precautionary lending, in practice member countries applied for an SBA mostly once
financing needs had already materialised (Reichmann and de Resende, 2014). Surveillance,
including through regular Article IV consultations, has been (and remains) the IMFs central
crisis prevention tool (Ostry and Zettelmeyer, 2005). This is not to say that there have been
no attempts to integrate more precautionary arrangements in the IMF’s lending portfolio.
In the early 1990s the IMF contemplated a Short-Term Financing Facility (STFF)
on which member countries with a strong policy framework but nonetheless facing short-
term external stress could draw unconditionally. The STFF was however never adopted due
to concerns in the IMF’s Executive Board about eligibility and the risks of committing re-
sources to counter severe financial pressures without a conditionality framework (IMF, 2003).
End-1998 the proposal for contingent IMF lending was reconsidered, spurred by the Asian
and Russian financial crises which affected many emerging economies through the contagion
channel. The Contingent Credit Line (CCL), launched in April 1999, was intended to assure
pre-screened countries (satisfying ex ante eligibility criteria) of access to IMF resources in
the event of exceptional capital account pressures due to external contagion; all the while
incentivising policy and institutional improvements. Since there were no requests for the
CCL in its original form, the instrument was revised in November 2000 to water down initial
monitoring requirements, simplify activation, and reduce costs (IMF, 2003). IMF staff com-
menced discussions with potentially eligible countries, but again no requests were made and
the CCL was allowed to expire in November 2003.4 The IMF (2003) itself identified a num-
ber of reasons for the very limited interest in the CCL, including ‘stigma’, i.e., concerns that
a CCL request would be perceived negatively, by domestic actors and/or external market
participants (see Section 3.1); the increasing popularity of alternative preventive strategies
(such as reserves accumulation or exchange rate flexibility); and global economic recovery.
Another key factor that reduced the attractiveness of the CCL was its lack of automaticity
(Marino and Volz, 2012). Access to a large part of CCL funds remained conditional upon
Executive Board approval of an ‘activation review’, creating uncertainty for prospective bor-
rowers. Subsequent debates centred around an instrument tentatively named the Reserve
Augmentation Line (RAL), which would address some of the problems with the CCL. Ul-
3According to Reichmann and de Resende (2014, p. 1), the distinction between crisis resolution and
prevention was “. . . already evident in the position of Keynes, who envisaged the IMF as somewhat akin to
a lender of last resort with large resources automatically available in cases of need, and that of Harry White,
who advocated a smaller Fund that would lend on a discretionary basis subject to policy conditionality”.
4Allegedly, only two strong candidate countries expressed a genuine interest in the CCL (IMF, 2003).
Interestingly, Mexico was the only country that came close to actually applying for a CCL, but in the end
it decided not to, mainly because of exchange rate appreciation pressures.
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timately it proved difficult to balance the twin goals of designing a sufficiently attractive
credit facility for potential users and safeguarding IMF resources (Reichmann and de Re-
sende, 2014). A global climate of abundant liquidity further reduced the urgency to reach
an agreement on the RAL.
The 2008 global financial crisis made clear that the IMF’s “. . . ability to mount a
preventative and systemic response was hampered by the inadequacy of its precautionary
lending instruments and a resource base that had not kept up with the rapid increase in
global trade and capital flows” (IMF, 2010, p. 5). The latter was dealt with during the April
2009 London summit of the G20, where it was agreed to triple the IMF’s non-concessional
lending resources to US$750 billion. Even before that, in October 2008, the IMF quickly
approved a new Short-Term Liquidity Facility (SLF). Once more, the SLF found no users,
as its access limits and repayment periods were judged insufficient and it had to compete
with the bilateral swap lines the US Federal Reserve and other advanced economy central
banks established around that time.
On 24 March 2009 the IMF announced the introduction of the Flexible Credit Line
(FCL), as part of a broader overhaul of its lending toolkit.5 The FCL incorporates several
elements prospective users of precautionary IMF lending had been advocating for a long
time (see IMF, 2015, for details). It is designed to provide large, upfront financing to
countries with strong fundamentals and proven sustained policy track records. The FCL
relinquishes all ex post conditionality. To avoid moral hazard it instead entails strict ex ante
conditionality, embodied in nine core qualification criteria: a sustainable external position; a
capital account dominated by private flows; a track record of steady and favourable sovereign
access to capital markets; a comfortable reserves position; sound public finances; low and
stable inflation in the context of sound monetary and exchange rate policies; a sound financial
system; effective financial sector supervision; and data transparency and integrity.6 In case
a country (confidentially) expresses interest in requesting an FCL and the IMF management
deems this request may be appropriate, IMF staff should prepare a concise note for an
informal Executive Board discussion in which the country is preliminarily assessed against
the above qualification criteria. If the country later decides to make a formal FCL request to
the Board, its appeal should be accompanied by a more comprehensive staff report, including
a detailed qualification assessment and a justification of the proposed access level.
Thanks to its exigent qualification standards the FCL’s operational modalities have
been kept ‘flexible’ indeed. One distinctive feature is that access under the FCL is uncapped,
although originally an implicit limit of 1000% of a country’s IMF quota applied (IMF, 2010).
Also, unlike the CLL for example, the FCL can be requested either on a precautionary basis
or to address actual financing needs and can be (fully or partially) drawn upon at the
borrower’s own discretion, without the need for separate Board approval. Initially countries
could choose between six-month and one-year FCLs without restrictions on the number of
successor agreements, provided they continue to meet the qualification criteria. The grace
and repayment periods of the FCL are relatively long and equal to those of the standard
SBA (borrowed amounts are due within three years and three months to five years after
5See the press release at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr0985.htm.
6For a detailed description of these qualification criteria and suggested indicators, see IMF (2009), or its
latest update, IMF (2015). It should be noted that there are no strict numerical cut-offs for FCL qualification.
Judgement forms an essential part of the qualification assessment by IMF staff.
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disbursement, compared to a nine-month roll-over in the SLF). Upon approval of an FCL,
countries pay a commitment fee which rises progressively with the level of access (between 15
and 60 basis points) and is refunded pro rata if drawings are made or the FCL is cancelled.
The costs of drawing are again equal to those of the SBA and increase with size and time, to
discourage borrowing beyond what is needed. Concurrent with the introduction of the FCL,
the IMF enhanced the SBA and its High-Access Precautionary variant (HAPA) by increasing
options to frontload assistance and widening eligibility. The ex post conditionality of the
SBA and SBA-HAPA, i.e., the need to negotiate an adjustment programme with the IMF,
and the IMF Board’s control over SBA(-HAPA) drawing could not be eliminated however
(Reichmann and de Resende, 2014).
In August 2010 the FCL was modified to further boost its attractiveness. The implicit
cap of 1000% of quota was removed and FCL arrangements could now be approved for either
one year (with no interim review of continued qualification) or two years (with a mid-term
review). The IMF moreover introduced the Precautionary Credit Line (PCL).7 This ‘light’
version of the FCL would provide upfront access of up to 500% of quota on approval, in
the absence of actual balance of payments needs, and combined ex ante qualification criteria
similar to the FCL’s (although somewhat less strict) with targeted ex post conditionality
(focused on tackling remaining vulnerabilities). In November 2011 the PCL was relabelled
Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) and broadened in scope: a six-month arrangement
was added to the menu of options and PLL access could from then on also be granted to
countries with present rather than potential financing needs.8
2.2 Current FCL arrangements9
Since the FCL’s creation in March 2009 three countries have entered into FCL arrangements
with the IMF. Mexico was the first country to access the FCL on 17 April 2009, an occasion
described by John Lipsky, First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, as “represent[ing]
the consolidation of a major step in the process of reforming the IMF and making its lending
framework more relevant to member countries’ needs”.10 Mexico’s example was soon followed
by Poland on 6 May and by Colombia on 11 May 2009. According to IMF (2014), additional
countries have expressed potential interest in the FCL since its inception, but ultimately, no
other formal requests were made.
As can be seen from Table 1, Mexico, Colombia and Poland have had six consecutive
FCL arrangements each as of April 2017.11. All of these arrangements have been treated
as strictly precautionary, with not a single drawing since 2009. It also appears that the
original cap of 1000% of quota and one-year duration were constraining factors, since Mexico
and Poland requested larger arrangements and all three FCL countries switched to two-
7See the press release at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10321.htm.
8See the press release at http://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr11424.
9An analysis of the PCL/PLL arrangement of Macedonia (agreed in January 2011 and terminated in
January 2013) and of the (ongoing) PLL arrangement of Morocco (agreed in August 2012 and renewed in
July 2014 and July 2016) falls outside the scope of the current paper.
10See the press release at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr09130.htm.
11In January 2016 Poland reduced the size of its fifth FCL from SDR15.5 billion to SDR13 billion. This
was not considered a new arrangement.
5
year arrangements once the August 2010 reforms opened up the possibility to do so. With
SDR31.5 billion (or about US$47 billion) Mexico’s first FCL constituted the largest ever
individual commitment of IMF resources in nominal terms. As of April 2017, the FCLs of
Mexico, Colombia and Poland together accounted for about two-thirds of total committed
IMF resources (SDR77.1 billion out of SDR115.1 billion).12
Whereas the multiple renewals of arrangements can partly be explained by the pro-
tracted nature of the global financial and economic crisis and may suggest FCL users attach
great value to the instrument, it could also reflect difficulties with exiting the FCL. Indeed,
Reichmann and de Resende (2014, p. 24) rightly point out that “. . . there is the tension
between a facility intended to be of strictly temporary use and a reality in which risks are
never absent”. Moreover, any positive signalling benefits from satisfying the FCL’s strict
qualification criteria could be reversed if the market (mis)interprets a country’s exit from
the FCL as a failure to remain eligible. The IMF is well aware of such ‘exit problems’. The
latest operational guidelines emphasise the need to clearly articulate country authorities’
exit strategies, contingent on the abatement of external risks, in FCL request or review doc-
uments (IMF, 2015).13 IMF staff has also proposed introducing a time-based element into
the FCL commitment fees to incentivise timely exit (IMF, 2014).
Table 1: FCL arrangements from March 2009 to April 2017
FCL-1 FCL-2 FCL-3 FCL-4 FCL-5 FCL-6
Mexico 17 Apr 2009 25 Mar 2010 10 Jan 2011 30 Nov 2012 26 Nov 2014 27 May 2016
Size (SDR billion) 31.5 31.5 47.3 47.3 47.3 62.4
% of quota 1000% 1000% 1500% 1304% 1304% 700%
Duration 1 year 1 year 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years
Poland 6 May 2009 2 Jul 2010 21 Jan 2011 18 Jan 2013 14 Jan 2015 13 Jan 2017
Size (SDR billion) 13.7 13.7 19.2 22 15.5 6.5
% of quota 1000% 1000% 1400% 1303% 918% 159%
Duration 1 year 1 year 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years
Colombia 11 May 2009 7 May 2010 6 May 2011 24 Jun 2013 17 Jun 2015 13 Jun 2016
Size (SDR billion) 7 2.3 3.9 3.9 3.9 8.2
% of quota 900% 300% 500% 500% 500% 400%
Duration 1 year 1 year 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years
Source: Authors’ compilation based on IMF press releases and country reports.
Notes: Duration and IMF quota are evaluated at the time the respective FCL arrangements were approved. IMF quota
revisions occurred in April 2008 (on an ad hoc basis, effective from 3 March 2011) and in December 2010 (under the 14th
General Review, effective from 26 January 2016). Mexico’s quota increased from SDR3.2 billion to SDR3.6 billion under the
first revision and to SDR8.9 billion under the second revision; Colombia’s quota remained unchanged at SDR774 million under
the first revision and increased to just over SDR2 billion under the second; Poland’s quota increased from SDR1.4 billion to
SDR1.7 billion under the first revision and to SDR4.1 billion under the second.
12These figures are based on the IMF’s own data on lending arrangements.
13In the latest review of their FCL arrangement the Polish authorities state: “On balance, we consider that
a new two-year FCL arrangement, albeit at a substantially lower access, would provide additional insurance
against adverse external shocks, while conveying a strong signal of Poland’s commitment to exit the facility
as soon as external conditions permit. In this context, we have continued our efforts to communicate our
intention to proceed with a smooth and gradual exit strategy to market participants and the broader public.
Our outreach has met only muted market reaction” (IMF, 2017, p. 56).
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3 What explains the selectivity of FCL arrangements?
3.1 Literature review
Given that to date only three countries have availed themselves of the FCL, the question
that naturally arises is why the uptake of this seemingly attractive instrument has been
so limited. The IMF itself and a handful of external studies have advanced a number of
potential reasons.14
First of all, although the abandoning of ex post conditionality in the FCL was meant to
reduce the stigma associated with IMF programmes, countries may still have been reluctant
to approach the IMF, especially in the absence of acute financing problems (IMF, 2011; John
and Knedlik, 2011; Marino and Volz, 2012; IMF, 2014). This lingering political stigma is a
legacy of past, often painful experiences with IMF structural adjustment programmes and
is thought to be particularly elevated in Asia and Latin America (Ito, 2012; IEO, 2013).
Hence, some countries have preferred to self-insure through previously accumulated reserves
or to rely on bilateral central bank swap lines, both alternatives to the FCL that also have
no ex post conditionality attached to them. Surveys of country authorities indeed confirm
the importance of political stigma and preference for self-insurance as factors inhibiting FCL
demand (IMF, 2011, 2014).15
Second, economic stigma may have been an issue too. Countries may fear that a request
for IMF financing, even if precautionary and subject to strict qualification criteria, would
be interpreted as signalling hidden vulnerabilities and therefore harm market confidence
(Marino and Volz, 2012; Prasad, 2014)16; a fortiori, they may fear the market reaction of
being denied access by the IMF’s Executive Board after a formal request. Although there
is some support for the existence of such fears from IMF surveys, the nature of stigma
is thought to be mostly political (IMF, 2014). Third, several emerging market economies
have expressed their dissatisfaction with the qualification criteria, perceiving them as overtly
strict, unclear and/or subjective (for example, with respect to what defines a ‘strong’ policy
track record). Fourth, perhaps the mere existence of the FCL provides sufficient insurance
to countries that investors believe would qualify for the FCL, obviating the need for actual
requests. An alternative view is that demand may not have been that weak after all in view
of the limited number of potentially eligible countries, due to the very high qualification
bar (Keller et al., 2009). Among those potential qualifiers some already had relatively high
external buffers (IMF, 2011, 2014).
On the supply side, the IMF has not actively promoted the FCL, Marino and Volz
(2012) argue. To be sure, a proliferation of large (and longer-term) precautionary arrange-
14Several of the following arguments are reminiscent of the debates surrounding earlier precautionary IMF
arrangements, such as the CCL (see IMF, 2003, and Section 2.1).
15Further anecdotal evidence can be found in the media. For example, a few days before the official
announcement of the FCL a senior official in the South Korean Ministry of Finance was quoted in the Wall
Street Journal as saying that “South Koreans tremble and financial markets turn sensitive whenever they
hear the word ‘IMF’, so it’s not easy for us to participate in the [FCL] program” (Kong and Venkat, 2009).
For Indonesia and Brazil too political considerations have been reported as precluding FCL requests (The
Economist, 2009).
16As Marino and Volz (2012) note, this is in part a first-mover problem which would be greatly diminished
by other countries’ positive experiences with the FCL (see Section 4).
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ments could crowd out resources for crisis resolution. Initially the first FCL arrangements
with Mexico, Poland and Colombia reduced the IMF’s forward commitment capacity (FCC),
i.e., the resources it has available for new financial commitments in the next 12 months, by
nearly half. However, the IMF’s FCC was later substantially increased by expanded New
Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) established with individual member countries (Reichmann
and de Resende, 2014). Finally, the IMF may also have interpreted the qualification criteria
very strictly in order to strengthen the signalling function of the FCL and to reduce moral
hazard concerns. In case weaknesses would emerge in an FCL country, the IMF might find
it very difficult not to continue or roll-over the FCL agreement, for fear of negative market
reactions; a problem Reichmann and de Resende (2014) refer to as ‘reverse stigma’.
Beyond the specifics of the FCL instrument, there is a large academic literature study-
ing the determinants of countries’ participation in IMF lending more generally (see, a.o.,
Steinwand and Stone, 2008; Moser and Sturm, 2011, for reviews), on which we can draw to
further inform our variable selection.17
Early studies focused mainly on variables linked to the macroeconomic-financial situa-
tion of the borrowing country, such as the level of international reserves, public debt or prior
economic growth, to explain the incidence of IMF lending (Bird and Orme, 1981; Joyce,
1992; Conway, 1994; Knight and Santaella, 1997). The more recent literature points to the
importance of economic, but also political links with the IMF’s main shareholders. However,
no absolute consensus exists on this and results tend to vary along with sample and variable
definitions and methodological approaches. Barro and Lee (2005), for example, find that
bilateral trade with the US (but not with major European countries) raises the probability
of a country entering an IMF loan programme, presumably because the IMF’s dominant
Executive Board member advances its commercial interests in lending decisions. Likewise,
Breen (2010) uncovers a positive correlation between the incidence of IMF borrowing and G5
exports. Others however fail to confirm the significance of US/European trade links, suggest
the effects are region- and period-specific, or even find negative associations with IMF loans
(Bird and Rowlands, 2001; Sturm et al., 2005; Eichengreen et al., 2008; Pop-Eleches, 2009).
Similarly, several studies show that countries on which US and/or European banks have
larger claims are more likely to borrow from the IMF (Broz and Hawes, 2006; Breen, 2010)
or at least receive larger loans when they do so (Oatley and Yackee, 2004; Copelovitch, 2010;
Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2012). Again, other studies have not been able to reproduce such
results using alternative specifications (Sturm et al., 2005; Eichengreen et al., 2008).
Next to case study evidence (see, e.g., Stiles, 1990; Killick, 1995), there is substantial
econometric support for the assertion that the political interests of major IMF shareholders
matter for access to (and the design of) IMF loans. Numerous papers have documented
positive associations between measures of alignment with the US and other G7 countries
in UN General Assembly (UNGA) voting and IMF loan participation.18 The underlying
17Often the determinants of IMF loan participation are studied not as a stand-alone topic but rather to
derive instrumental variables whose exogenous variation can be used to isolate the effects of IMF loans on
economic growth or other outcomes. Such an approach however differs from what we intend to do in this
paper (see Section 4).
18Besides similarity in UNGA voting patterns, the econometric literature has considered UN Security
Council membership (Dreher et al., 2009); US (military) aid (Oatley and Yackee, 2004; Eichengreen et al.,
2008); peace treaties with Israel (Harrigan et al., 2006); and an index based on energy resources, nuclear and
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argument here is that the G7 countries exchange their votes on IMF programmes in the
Executive Board for the backing of their interests during UNGA voting sessions. Estimates
by Barro and Lee (2005) show the incidence and size of IMF borrowing to be positively
correlated with the fraction of UNGA votes that a country casts in accordance with the
UNGA votes of the US and of major European IMF shareholders (see also Oatley and Yackee,
2004; Copelovitch, 2010; Dreher and Walter, 2010; Papi et al., 2015). Thacker (1999) argues
that what really augments the probability of receiving an IMF loan is a country’s alignment
on UNGA votes that the US State Department identifies as ‘important’ and, more specifically,
changes over time in such alignment, towards the US stance (see also Pop-Eleches, 2009).19
Alternatively, Barnebeck Andersen et al. (2006) claim that a more theoretically sound and
empirically better-performing measure is the difference between alignment with the US on
all UNGA votes and alignment on UNGA votes important to the US; a variable which
proxies the extent to which a country is prepared to make foreign policy concessions to the
US (see also Kilby, 2009; Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2012). Investigating the role of political
alignment seems particularly interesting in the context of the FCL. As Marino and Volz
(2012, p. 27) point out,“[i]t is . . . not surprising to hear allegations that only countries whose
governments are seen as relatively cozy with the US - namely Mexico, Colombia and Poland
- have requested an FCL”.20
There is also general econometric evidence that past IMF borrowing explains re-
engagement with the IMF (Przeworski and Vreeland, 2002; Sturm et al., 2005; Bird et al.,
2015). According to Vreeland (2007, p. 59), one way to interpret this is in line with the
political stigma hypothesis cited above: “in a country where IMF programs have become
business as usual. . . the costs of ‘selling out’ are smaller. . . [I]t is difficult for opposition to
claim that the current leadership is selling out by signing an IMF arrangement if many pre-
vious leaders have also done so”.21 Another political cost-related determinant of IMF loan
participation for which empirical support has been found is recent elections. The intuition
is that government officials are more likely to negotiate an agreement with the IMF early on
in their electoral term, so as to reduce the possibility that any stigma effects disadvantage
them in the next election (Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000; Papi et al., 2015).
Finally, both conceptually and methodologically our study of FCL selectivity is closely
related to two evaluations of the bilateral central bank swaps signed in the wake of the
global financial crisis. Based on single- and multi-regressor probit regressions and a sample
of 27 emerging markets, Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) identify the exposure of US banks to
individual countries as the single most important criterion explaining the selective extension
military power, and strategic location (Reynaud and Vauday, 2009) as potential geo-political determinants
of the likelihood of signing an IMF agreement.
19In its annual Voting Practices in the United Nations reports to US Congress the US State Department
identifies key votes for each UNGA session. These are votes on issues directly affecting US interests and on
which the US lobbied extensively (see Thacker, 1999).
20Krueger (1998, pp. 2014-2015) reports that in response to the 1994 Mexican peso crisis the US (Clinton)
Administration lobbied fiercely to get the IMF aboard in a record-size rescue package for its Mexican ally; to
the extent even that the usual minimal notice to Executive Directors for consulting with their governments
before voting was discarded.
21Of course, the duration of (or recidivism in) past IMF borrowing is likely also the result of other factors,
not the least structural economic and institutional weaknesses in borrowing countries (see e.g., Bird et al.,
2004).
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of swap lines by the US Federal Reserve to the central banks of Brazil, Mexico, South Korea
and Singapore. This should not come as a surprise given the domestic mandate of the
Federal Reserve. Aizenman et al. (2011) extend the analysis to the prevalence and size of
swaps between the Federal Reserve, European Central Bank and People’s Bank of China,
on the one hand, and the central banks of all remaining countries (among which 21 actual
swap recipients), on the other hand. The results show that countries which are larger export
destinations for the US or China tend to receive larger swaps from them. An important
drawback to both studies is the very limited number of potential swap determinants they
take into consideration. In our assessment of FCL selectivity, on the contrary, we will draw
on a much wider-ranging list of variables, inspired by the FCL qualification framework and
the just-reviewed literature.
3.2 Empirical strategy and data description
3.2.1 Sample and variable selection
As our sample of potential FCL candidates we take the group of emerging markets included
in JP Morgan’s Emerging Market Bond Index Global (EMBI Global hereafter) as of end-
March 2009, when the IMF officially introduced the FCL instrument. Inclusion of countries
in the EMBI Global is based on World Bank-defined per capita income brackets, countries’
debt restructuring history and the issuance of large, longer-term US dollar-denominated
debt instruments (with an outstanding face value of at least US$500 million and minimum
2.5 years until maturity) for which reliable daily prices are available. In short, the EMBI
Global group consists of non-advanced countries with recent, sizeable access to US dollar debt
markets.22 Excluding conflict-stricken Iraq from this group (for reasons of data availability),
we end up with a sample of 37, of which three FCL and 34 non-FCL comparator countries
(see Appendix Table A1).
In order to empirically establish which variables explain whether or not a country
enters into a FCL arrangement with the IMF we need to decide ex ante on a list of potential
correlates of the IMF’s FCL supply and/or countries’ FCL demand. The content of the official
FCL qualification framework (Section 2.1) and the preceding literature review (Section 3.1)
help us to derive a first, extensive list of candidate variables. Below we briefly discuss the
sort of variables we take up in our analysis. Appendix Table A2 provides a detailed overview
of all 86 individual variables, their definitions and sources.
To begin with, in its operational guidelines the IMF itself proposes an elaborate set
of relevant indicators for each of the nine FCL qualification criteria/domains (see IMF,
2009, Annex I, Table 1). From this set of indicators we select those that are expressed
as quantitative macroeconomic-financial measures and that are available for all or most of
our sample countries; including various debt and reserves ratios, bond spreads, and fiscal
balance, inflation, exchange rate and financial sector indicators (mostly collected from IMF
22By focusing on EMBI Global constituents we already ‘pre-select’ countries on their (recent) sovereign
access to international capital markets, which is one of the nine official FCL qualification criteria. Indeed,
EMBI bond spreads (and their averages) are among the indicators proposed by the IMF to evaluate the
criterion ‘track record of steady sovereign access to capital markets at favorable terms’ (IMF, 2009, Annex
I, Table 1). Our EMBI Global sample is the largest set of countries for which EMBI spreads were available
as of March 2009.
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databases). To evaluate the ‘[a]ccountability, transparency, and communication regarding
[monetary] policy objectives’ (IMF, 2009, p. 13), we take the central bank independence and
transparency indices from Dincer and Eichengreen (2014).23
Additional supply-side variables we consider include government effectiveness and con-
trol of corruption scores from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)
and different measures of democratic strength from the Center for Systemic Peace Polity IV
Project database and the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank’s Database of
Political Institutions (DPI). These are deemed to capture the overall quality and credibility
of countries’ institutional frameworks, on which IMF staff is asked to make a (qualitative)
judgement too.24 We also add the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) overall country risk
rating, a very broad summary indicator of economic, financial and political risks. Excessive
risks would discourage the IMF from extending an FCL.
Next, we measure the economic interests of the IMF’s main shareholders in prospec-
tive FCL countries. In a similar fashion as Thacker (1999), Barro and Lee (2005), Sturm
et al. (2005), Presbitero and Zazzaro (2012) and others, we calculate each country’s imports
from and bilateral trade with the US, major European countries (Germany, UK, France and
Italy) and the G7 as a share of total (worldwide) US/European/G7 exports or trade; indi-
vidual countries’ FDI and portfolio investment liabilities to the US/Europe/G7 as a share
of total US/European/G7 FDI or portfolio investment assets; and the consolidated claims
of US/European/G7 banks on each country divided by total consolidated banking claims of
the US/Europe/G7.25
To approximate political alignment with the IMF’s main shareholders, we follow Pres-
bitero and Zazzaro (2012) and construct different indicators based on countries’ similarities
in voting patterns in the UNGA (cf. Section 3.1). A first subset of measures uses the fraction
of all UNGA votes by a country that is aligned with votes by the US, major European coun-
tries or the G7.26 Alternative measures consider alignment with the US only on important
UNGA votes, or the difference between alignment on all votes and alignment on important
votes.
On the demand side, we expect countries that were more exposed to potential external
shocks, or that were already experiencing crisis pressures, at the time the FCL instrument
23The FCL qualification criteria also include data transparency and integrity, as measured by subscription
to the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS). We disregard this variable in our analysis as
there is no variation between the three FCL countries. Mexico, Colombia and Poland all three subscribed
to the SDDS in 1996 and met its specifications in 2000.
24Initially, the IMF (2009) did not prescribe using any quantitative indicators of institutional strength
for staff assessments of FCL qualification. In its 2015 operational guidelines, however, the IMF explicitly
proposed government effectiveness and control of corruption from the WGI to inform judgment (see IMF,
2015, p. 17).
25Following Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) and Aizenman et al. (2011), we scale our bilateral trade
and investment variables by total trade/investment of the US, Europe or G7, rather than by the total
trade/investment or GDP of our sample countries (like, e.g., Barro and Lee, 2005; Sturm et al., 2005).
We believe this helps keeping the focus on the supply side, i.e., the relative exposure of the IMF’s main
shareholders to each sample country.
26In line with the literature, we assign an alignment score of 1 if two countries both vote ‘yes’ on a UNGA
resolution, both vote ‘no’, both abstain, or both are absent; a score of 0.5 if one country votes and the other
abstains or is absent; and a score of 0 if countries oppose each other. To assess alignment with European
countries or the G7 we average the pairwise scores.
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was launched to be more inclined to enter into an FCL arrangement with the IMF. We
evaluate the exposure to shocks using indicators of trade openness and of de facto and de
jure financial openness, such as the presence of capital controls as codified by Chinn and
Ito (2006) and Ferna´ndez et al. (2015). Actual crisis pressures are proxied by changes in
real GDP growth relative to the (three) previous year(s); changes in the net barter terms of
trade; changes in the value of exports; the range (i.e., the difference between maximum and
minimum values) of JP Morgan EMBI country spreads over the past year; and exchange
market pressure indices (EMPIs).27 In the spirit of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and
Eichengreen et al. (1995) we create EMPIs as the weighted average of, respectively, two
or three components: real exchange rate depreciation, the rate of international reserves
depletion, and positive changes in short-term interest rates (i.e., the three main channels
through which countries can meet excess demand for foreign exchange). To prevent any
single component from dominating the EMPI, we choose the weights so that the two/three
components have equal (country-specific) sample volatilities.
We also look at countries’ past experiences with IMF programmes, as these may hold
information about possible political stigma. We first take the time countries have spent under
previous IMF programmes (as a share of total time since their accession to the IMF) and
the number of years that have passed since countries’ last IMF programme as (admittedly
very rough) gauges of the domestic political costs of signing a new arrangement. Ceteris
paribus, we expect political stigma to be inversely related with the time countries have
spent under IMF arrangements, and positively with the numbers of years since the last
arrangement (cf. Section 3.1; Vreeland, 2007). In addition, we try to take into consideration
countries’ historical record of non-compliance with IMF programme conditionality, a proxy
for antagonism between the IMF and the borrowing country (government and/or citizens).
We hypothesise that countries which had a contentious relationship with the IMF in the
past would be less likely to enter into an FCL arrangement (even if it does not involve
ex-post conditionality), because of higher political stigma on the demand side and greater
reticence on part of the IMF to make available large credits. Since the IMF’s Monitoring
Fund Arrangements (MONA) database on programme conditions and their implementation
record has several problems, which lead it to overstate compliance (Arpac et al., 2008), we
opt for the approach proposed by Killick (1995), Joyce (2006) and Dreher and Walter (2010).
These last authors suggest labelling a country as compliant with conditionality when no more
than 25% of the amount originally agreed under an IMF arrangement remained undrawn
at programme expiration. Because typical IMF loans are payable in tranches, whereby
disbursement depends on the fulfilment by the borrower of different performance criteria,
it is believed that non-compliance and programme interruptions are important causes of
large unused IMF funds. A drawback to this approach is that IMF credit lines may also
remain undrawn because of improvements in the borrower’s economy or when the borrower
uses (part of) such credit line as a precautionary instrument (Arpac et al., 2008). Our
variable of choice is the share of IMF arrangements since 1990 on which a country was
‘non-compliant’ (as just defined), excluding arrangements that were ongoing at the time the
FCL was launched and arrangements that the IMF itself explicitly classifies as having been
27Since the seminal work of Girton and Roper (1977), EMPIs have been widely used in the empirical
literature on identifying currency crises and speculative attacks.
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approved on a precautionary basis.28
To test the hypothesis that recent elections reduce politicians’ worries about the po-
litical costs of engaging with the IMF in the particular context of the FCL, we construct a
variable counting the number of years since the last legislative/executive election with data
from the World Bank’s DPI.
Lastly, we include GDP and GDP per capita, both measured in purchasing power
parity (PPP) terms, as two extra control variables.
All of the foregoing variables are evaluated before the IMF’s FCL press release on 24
March 2009, in order to reduce endogeneity concerns. For the majority of variables, only
available at yearly or quarterly frequency, we take end-2008 values; for series with monthly
(daily) frequency we use values up to February 2009 (23 March 2009). In some cases we
calculate averages or other transformations over longer pre-FCL periods (see Appendix Table
A2 for more details).
3.2.2 Descriptives
Before moving to a more formal analysis, we inspect our potential correlates of FCL
participation graphically. Appendix Figure A1 presents bar charts for (a selection of) the
variables we consider, enabling us to locate the three FCL countries within the distribution
of these variables over our sample countries.29
Macroeconomic and financial qualification criteria
The bar charts of Appendix Figure A1 first of all confirm the assertion that FCL qualifiers
should have very strong macroeconomic fundamentals. At the eve of the FCL announcement
Mexico and Colombia had some of the lowest external debt burdens among our sample
countries, whereas Poland’s external debt-to-GDP ratio of 41% was just below the sample
mean (see Figure A1, panel (a)). All three FCL countries had modest current account deficits
(panel (b)). In Mexico and Colombia short-term external debt was very low relative to GDP;
in Poland this ratio was high compared to most other sample countries, but not nearly as
elevated as in Bulgaria or Hungary (panel (c)). FCL countries’ external debt did not seem
to be overly concentrated with one particular sector of the economy, according to the World
Bank-IMF Quarterly External Debt Statistics (QEDS) database.
FDI and portfolio inflows dominated overall capital inflows in Mexico and Colombia
but not in Poland. Mexico and Poland had the highest shares of private holdings of external
debt among the countries for which this indicator was available from Arslanalp and Tsuda
(2014) (panel (d)). Likewise, according to World Bank data on long-term external debt,
private holdings were relatively large in Mexico and Poland and above the sample average in
Colombia. Foreign holdings of local currency Mexican and Polish government debt securities
were considerable but certainly not exceptional.
28Whereas our data on IMF disbursements go all the way back to 1952, the indicator of whether an IMF
arrangement was approved on a precautionary basis is only available from May 1984 onwards.
29For reasons of space, we do not present bar charts for all 86 variables listed in Appendix Table A2. The
omitted bar charts are available upon request.
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The FCL countries’ track record of capital market access compares very favourably to
the rest of the sample. Poland, Mexico and Colombia found themselves in the bottom of the
distribution of 30-day, one-year and five-year average EMBI Global country yield spreads
prior to the launch of the FCL (panel (e)). Only Chinese spreads were slightly below Polish
spreads at the time. One-year maximum country spreads tell a very similar story.30
Notwithstanding the fact that the relative international reserves positions of the three
FCL countries could not compete with those of China, Russia, and a number of smaller
economies, they remained comfortable. In Mexico and Colombia total reserves stood at
roughly 400% of short-term debt (on an original maturity basis) and in Poland at 96%
(panel (f)); ratios to short-term debt plus the current account deficit were 214%, 194% and
62%, respectively.31 Reserves also covered more than the commonly advised 20% of M2
(panel (g)) and three months of import, but did not appear to be ‘excessive’. From this
point of view at least, there was still room for an extra liquidity backstop under the form of
an FCL in the three countries.
Public finances seemed sound in Mexico, Poland and Colombia, with close-to-average
public debt-to-GDP ratios (panel (h)) and moderate overall and structural fiscal deficits
(panel (i)). Colombia and Mexico ran small primary fiscal surpluses over 2008, while Poland
had only a minor primary fiscal deficit. Again, however, quite a few countries, most notably
commodity exporters, outperformed the FCL countries in these dimensions.
Furthermore, the three FCL countries were characterised by lower inflation (panel (j))
and inflation volatility than the large majority of our sample. Poland and Colombia were
among the best-ranked countries in terms of central bank transparency but not central bank
independence (where Mexico received a much better score).32 Real exchange rate volatility
over the 12 months before the FCL’s launch was relatively high in the three FCL countries
(panel (k)). This can be partly explained by the high degree of de facto flexibility in the
exchange rate regimes of these countries, which could be an indication of shock absorption
rather than a sign of vulnerability.33
Financial sector indicators too looked rather auspicious in the FCL countries, in spite
of clear differences between them and with the caveat that the IMF Financial Soundness
Indicators (FSI) were only available for a limited number of comparator countries. On the
aggregate, the Colombian and Mexican banking systems were well-capitalised (panel (l)),
liquid and profitable (panel (m)). Capital adequacy and liquidity were considerably lower
in Poland, but still comfortably above conventional international standards.34 Overall bank
30Benchmark domestic (local currency) government bond yields were not readily available for most of our
sample and are therefore not included in our analysis. Limited data retrieved from Datastream suggests
that five- and ten-year Treasury bond yields of Poland and Mexico were, on average, lower than bond yields
of, among others, Turkey, Russia, Hungary, Brazil, Indonesia and Vietnam, but higher than bond yields of
China, Malaysia and Chile.
31Ideally, we would look at the ratio of reserves to short-term debt on a remaining maturity basis, including
amortisation on medium- and long-term debt. Again, such data were not readily available.
32It should be noted, however, that the US Federal Reserve is classified by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014)
as one of the least independent central banks.
33Ilzetzki et al. (2017) classify the de facto exchange rate regimes of Mexico and Poland as ‘managed floats’
and Colombia’s as a ‘broad crawl’ in February 2009.
34For example, Basel II standards prescribe a minimum (Tier-1) regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets
ratio of 8% (6%). End-2008 this ratio stood at 11% (10.7%) for the Polish banking system (panel (l)).
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funding risks seemed manageable in Mexico, Poland and Colombia, with customer deposit
to loan ratios roughly between 85% and 100% and foreign currency shares of bank liabilities
all below 30% (panel (n)). Regarding asset quality, non-performing loans (NPL) were 3-4%
of gross loans in the FCL countries (panel (o)). Private sector credit to GDP was greater in
Poland (48%) than in Colombia and Mexico, but arguably still at a sustainable level.
Institutional quality and governance
Judging from the World Bank’s WGI, the FCL countries’ institutional quality was above
sample average, but not outstanding. Poland was clearly rated higher than Mexico and
Colombia on dimensions of government effectiveness (panel (p)) and control of corruption.
Similar observations can be made with respect to the FCL countries’ ‘Polity’ scores, which
aggregate information on executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority and po-
litical participation. In terms of checks and balances, an indicator counting the number of
independent ‘veto players’ in a country’s political system (i.e., decision makers whose agree-
ment is needed to change policy), Mexico was ranked first, together with Argentina and
Brazil. Colombia and Poland followed closely with just one veto player less, as did several
other countries (panel (q)).
More noticeably, in the months prior to the launch of the FCL the EIU placed Mexico,
Poland and Colombia among the countries with the lowest combined economic, financial
and political risks (panel (r)). Only Chile received an overall risk rating that was markedly
lower than Mexico’s.
Economic and political interests of main IMF shareholders
Figure A1 further shows that, in relative terms, both Mexico and Poland were economically
and financially important to the IMF’s main shareholders. A clear outlier, Mexico accounted
for almost 12% of the total value of exports by the US (panel (s)) and for 11% of total US
trade in 2008. Only China was more important to US trade, thanks to large Chinese exports
to the US. Poland, on the other hand, was the most prominent importer of European goods
in our sample, receiving nearly 3% of all exports from Germany, the UK, France and Italy
combined; if total trade with these European countries is considered, only China and Russia
trumped Poland. Along the same lines, Mexico and Poland were, respectively, the second
and fourth largest import and trading partners of the G7 bloc (panels (t) and (u)). Similarly,
Mexico had the largest stock of inward FDI from the US (over 2% of total US FDI assets)
(panel (v)) and Poland the largest FDI stock from Europe (over 1% of the total) among
sample countries. China and Brazil were the only two countries with larger FDI liabilities to
the G7 than Mexico and Poland (panel (w)). Comparable rankings apply to sample countries’
portfolio investment liabilities to the US, Europe and the G7. Mexico was also home to more
than 5% of the consolidated foreign claims by US banks, putting it far ahead of the rest of the
sample (panel (x)). The exposure of European banks was relatively large in Poland (about
0.6% of their foreign claims). On the whole, Mexico and Poland constituted the second
and fifth largest exposures of G7 banks, flanked by China, Russia and Brazil (panel (y)).
Colombia seems much less important from the perspective of US/European/G7 exporters,
investors and banks; only its share in total US exports exceeded the sample average.
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Our UNGA voting-based measures point to strong political alignment of the FCL
countries with major IMF shareholders. When all 2008 UNGA votes are considered, Poland
was the sample country most aligned with the US, together with Ukraine (panel (z)),
and the third-most aligned with major European countries or the G7, preceded merely by
Bulgaria and Hungary (by a very small margin) (panel (aa)). Mexico’s and Colombia’s 2008
political alignment with IMF heavyweights was less strong than Poland’s but still close
to or above the sample average. With respect to UNGA votes that the US identified as
‘important’, Poland was the US’s closest ally. Interestingly, Poland and Mexico were among
the top-ranked when it came to political concessions to the US, proxied by the difference
between alignment on all UNGA votes and on important votes; Colombia too is found in
the upper half of the sample distribution of this variable (panel (ab)). The high degree of
political alignment and, more so, of voting concessions to the US in the FCL countries is
also evident when we take five-year averaged scores.35
Crisis exposure and pressures
The FCL countries did not stand out with respect to trade or financial openness. The
exports to GDP ratios of Colombia (18%) and Mexico (28%) were far below that of Poland
(39%) and the sample average. The extent of capital account restrictions was moderate in
comparison to non-FCL sample countries according to the indices constructed by Chinn and
Ito (2006) (panel (ac)) or Ferna´ndez et al. (2015). Also the de facto financial openness of
Poland, Mexico and Colombia, as measured by total financial liabilities or the net foreign
asset (NFA) position to GDP, was less than or not too far removed from sample means.
As documented in the IMF staff reports accompanying their FCL applications, Mexico,
Poland and Colombia already felt the pressures of the global financial and economic crisis
end-2008/early 2009; but so did most other countries. Real GDP growth in Mexico, Poland
and Colombia was about 2-3 percentage points lower in 2008 than the year before, and 1.5-
2.5 percentage points below the average of the three previous years (panel (ad)). However, in
several non-FCL countries growth fell more than 5 percentage points. Year-on-year changes
in the net barter terms of trade were still positive in Colombia and Mexico end-2008 and
only slightly negative in Poland (-1.8%). The total value of Mexican, Polish and Colombian
exports shrank by -35%, -33% and -19%, respectively, between February 2008 and February
2009, but more than a third of the sample countries recorded export declines in excess of 40%
over the same period. One-year ranges in EMBI spreads testify to the relative resilience of
FCL countries’ financing costs prior to the introduction of the FCL. The differences in mini-
mum and maximum country spreads over the year running up to 23 March 2009 were limited
to 314, 479 and 586 basis points in Poland, Mexico and Colombia. Only China and Chile
fared better than Poland. As per the two-component EMPIs, weighted sums of percentage
exchange rate depreciation and percentage declines in international reserves stocks, Poland
experienced the most severe exchange market pressure among sample countries during the
six months between September 2008 and February 2009 (panel (ae)). Also Mexico and
Colombia underwent relatively large exchange market pressures according to this indicator.36
35Sample countries that consistently had the lowest scores for political alignment and/or concessions to
the US include Venezuela, China, Vietnam, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Egypt.
36Average EMPI values over September 2008 - February 2009 are elevated for Poland, Mexico and Colombia
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Three-component EMPIs, which take into account interest rate changes in addition to
exchange rate and reserves changes, put Ukraine, Russia and Serbia before Poland in terms
of exchange market pressure (due to a comparatively large interest rate decline in the latter).
Prior experiences with IMF arrangements
We do not discern any clear association between our indicators of historical experiences with
IMF programmes and FCL participation. Between joining the IMF and the introduction of
the FCL, Colombia, Mexico and Poland had spent 38%, 31% and 25% of their time under
IMF arrangements, which puts them roughly between the first quartile and the median of
our country sample (panel (af)). In terms of years since their last experiences with an IMF
programme, the FCL countries are quite heterogeneous (panel (ag)). At the eve of the FCL,
Poland had exited its previous IMF arrangement, an SBA that was in force between August
1994 and March 1996, almost exactly 13 years. The SBA that Mexico concluded with the
IMF in July 1999 expired in November 2000, roughly eight years before the launch of the
FCL. And in Colombia memories of engagement with the IMF were even more vivid, as its
SBA of May 2005 came to an end only in November 2006.37
Based on the share of previous IMF arrangements with large amounts of undrawn
SDRs at expiration, an oft-used proxy for non-compliance with IMF conditionality, Mexico
and Colombia were ranked among the least ‘compliant’ sample countries (panel (ah)). This
seems to run counter to our hypotheses about the influence of prior non-compliance on the
likelihood of an FCL arrangement. However, a closer look at IMF country reports and press
releases reveals that Mexican authorities left about 37% of the SDRs available under their
1999-2000 SBA undrawn because of improvements in Mexico’s external position, rather
than conditionality breaches. Likewise, Colombia did not make any SDR purchases under
its 1999-2002 Extended Fund Facility (EFF) since authorities themselves decided to treat
the EFF as a precautionary arrangement (even if the IMF does not classify it as such in its
own database). We therefore conclude that the SDR-based indicator of ‘non-compliance’ is
too noisy a measure to be useful for our purposes and exclude it from the rest of our analysis.
Elections
In Mexico and Colombia legislative and executive elections had taken place about two years
before the IMF’s new FCL modality was announced, whereas in Poland only one (full)
year had passed since its latest parliamentary election and three years since the election of
president Kaczyn´ski. The three FCL participants do not seem to stand out in this regard,
as several non-FCL countries too had elections around the same time.
Economic size and development
Lastly, in terms of economic size and overall level of economic development, the FCL
mostly because of large exchange rate depreciations. Poland and Mexico also saw relatively large reserves
losses during the first two months of this period.
37A number of countries were already engaged in IMF programmes at the time the FCL was announced;
see Appendix Table A1.
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countries are no outliers in our sample (panels (ai) and (aj)). Mexico’s (PPP-based) GDP
was surpassed by that of Russia, Brazil and Indonesia and dwarfed by China’s, which is a
clear outlier. Poland and Colombia had economies that represented roughly 40% and 25%
of Mexican GDP, respectively, but were still well above the sample median. At just over
19,000 international dollars, Poland’s (PPP-based) GDP per capita was about 23% higher
than Mexico’s and 88% higher than Colombia’s.
Univariate tests
Appendix Table A2 reports the sample means of all variables we have just discussed, separate
for the three FCL and 34 comparator countries. It also presents the results of simple one-
tailed t-tests of the null hypothesis that the mean value of a particular variable is equal in
FCL and non-FCL countries, as well as the rank-sum test due to Wilcoxon (1945) and Mann
and Whitney (1947).38 The latter is a non-parametric test of the null that the two samples
come from populations with the same distribution, which does not require the assumption
that variables are normally distributed. Although one should be careful not to draw too
strong conclusions from these univariate tests, we find that several of the differences between
Mexico, Poland and Colombia and the rest of the sample we pointed out above are indeed
statistically significant.
In terms of macroeconomic-financial and institutional factors, the FCL countries were,
above all, marked by significantly lower EMBI spreads, lower and less volatile inflation, more
checks and balances and lower overall risk ratings, in line with the supply-side arguments
we postulated above. The tests further suggest lower external debt, higher bank shares of
total external debt, higher private holdings of debt, lower reserves to M2 ratios, greater
central bank transparency, higher returns on bank equity and assets, less foreign currency
bank liabilities and non-performing bank loans, greater control of corruption and government
effectiveness, and a higher degree of democracy in FCL countries, although significance levels
and/or sample sizes are smaller for these variables. Trade, investment and banking links with
major IMF shareholders, in particular the US; most measures of political alignment with the
US, Europe and the G7; and concessions to the US were also significantly stronger in FCL
countries, again supporting arguments advanced in the literature on IMF lending. Exchange
rate volatility and exchange market pressures were found to be higher in Mexico, Poland
and Colombia, which could explain their demand for an FCL arrangement.
38Since standard Student’s t-tests assume that the two populations from which samples are drawn have
equal variances, we have also run alternative t-tests which drop this assumption and use the approximation
of Satterthwaite (1946) to calculate degrees of freedom. The results are qualitatively very similar to those
presented in Appendix Table A2 and are available upon request.
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3.2.3 Model specification and selection
To evaluate the influence of the foregoing variables on the probability of participation in an
FCL arrangement we estimate probit models of the following form using maximum likelihood:
P (FCLi = 1|Xi) = Φ(X ′iβ) (1)
where FCLi is a dummy variable that takes a value one for FCL countries Mexico, Colombia
and Poland and a value zero otherwise; Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution
function; Xi is a vector of potential correlates of FCL participation; β is a vector of model
parameters to be estimated; and subscript i refers to the ith country.
Reduced-form model specification (1) does not explicitly distinguish between factors
determining FCL demand by governments on the one hand and determinants of FCL supply
by the IMF on the other. In practice, like any other IMF arrangement, an FCL is the joint
outcome of both a government’s wish to seek such an arrangement and the IMF Executive
Board’s willingness to approve the request. Unfortunately, we only observe the final FCL
arrangements to which governments and the IMF mutually agreed. We do not have any
data on unsuccessful FCL applications by countries (or on unreciprocated solicitations of
governments by the IMF to accept an FCL), information which is kept strictly confidential
(as prescribed by IMF policy). Some studies looking into participation in IMF arrangements
have suggested estimating bivariate probit models with partial observability, which attempt
to disentangle demand and supply effects in a system of two equations (Knight and Santaella,
1997; Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000, 2002; Stone, 2008). Important drawbacks to this kind
of models include the need for multiple restrictions to achieve identification (see Poirier,
1980, for technical details) and difficulties with maximum likelihood convergence in small
samples (Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2012). Hence, we prefer to follow the large majority of
the literature and stick to single-equation probit models. We bear in mind the caveat that,
strictly speaking, our estimated parameters should be interpreted as reflecting a mix of
demand and supply factors.39
Moreover, since only three countries entered into an FCL arrangement, we estimate
very parsimonious models. To avoid overfitting our models we only include a limited number
of explanatory variables. As a first step, we estimate models where each of the explanatory
variables discussed above is introduced individually. On the basis of these single-regressor
probits and the foregoing statistical tests, we will then proceed with selecting a list of well-
performing variables to be included together in a multi-regressor probit.40 Data availability,
39Another assumption we make here is that the participation of Mexico, Colombia and Poland in the FCL
were independent events. Especially on the supply side, this seems like a reasonable assumption. Granting
an FCL arrangement to, say, Mexico, should not make IMF staff more or less likely to favourably assess
the applications of particular other countries (or would make the IMF Executive Board more or less likely
to approve other applications). On the demand side, it could be that, after Mexico had overcome the ‘first
mover’ problem, other countries became more inclined to apply for an FCL arrangement too. But even then,
it is unclear which countries would be more (or less) sensitive to Mexico’s move.
40We acknowledge that using the significance of coefficients estimated in single-variable regressions to
select variables to be included in multi-variable regressions does not guarantee that we end up with the best
possible model. Therefore, as a robustness test, we will attempt a number of variations on our baseline
specification.
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the relation of variables to theory and the existing empirical literature, and the strength of
correlation between variables (to avoid problems of collinearity) will be used as additional
criteria to narrow down the list of variables.
3.3 Probit estimation results
3.3.1 Single-regressor probits
Appendix Table A3 shows the estimation results of the single-regressor probit models for each
of the 86 explanatory variables considered, together with a number of statistics commonly
used to evaluate model performance, such as the Akaike and Bayesian information criteria
(AIC and BIC) and McFadden pseudo R2s. Next to the fitted probit coefficients, we present
average marginal effects, the interpretation of which is more straightforward and similar to
that of the coefficients produced by standard OLS.41 To judge statistical significance, we
employ Huber-White robust standard errors for the probit coefficients and standard errors
calculated using the delta method for the marginal effects.
The results are broadly in line with the statistical tests of Appendix Table A2. When
evaluated independently, greater private holdings of debt, lower EMBI spreads, lower reserves
to M2, lower and less volatile inflation, greater central bank transparency, higher exchange
rate volatility, higher checks and balances, lower risk ratings, stronger trade, investment
and banking links with important IMF shareholders (again especially with the US), political
alignment and concessions on important US foreign policy issues, and greater exchange
market pressures significantly increased the likelihood of FCL participation.42 The influence
of most of the statistically significant variables is economically important too. For example,
according to the marginal effects, a 100 basis point decrease in the one-year averaged EMBI
spread would increase a country’s chances of FCL involvement with about 6.7% on average.
A 1% lower inflation rate would boost this probability with 4.7%. And 1% increases in a
country’s share in total US exports, its share in the total outward FDI stock of the US,
and its share in total US bank claims would add 2.9%, 11.4% and 7.7%, respectively, to
the likelihood of FCL participation. Likewise, an increase of one standard deviation in the
‘political concessions to the US’ score (+0.11) would augment FCL likelihood by 11.5%. A
one standard deviation rise in the six-month averaged, two-component EMPI (+3.5) would
lead to a 9.4% higher probability of FCL participation.
Based on the AIC and BIC, the probit models of inflation and inflation volatility, the
two-component EMPI, liabilities to US banks, checks and balances, one-year averaged EMBI
spreads, and political concessions to the US have the best fit (making abstraction of the mod-
els with the smallest sample sizes). These are also the models with the highest explanatory
power, according to the pseudo R2s. However, if we take an estimated probability of 50%
or more as indicating that the model predicts FCL participation for a particular country,
41In our probit models the marginal effect of a continuous variable x1 equals ∂P (FCLi = 1|Xi)/∂x1i =
β1φ(X
′
iβ), where β1 is the probit coefficient corresponding to x1 and φ is the standard normal density
function. Through φ(X ′iβ), this marginal effect depends on Xi, i.e., the values of all regressors for country
i. The ‘average marginal effects’ we present in the paper are simple averages of the marginal effects over all
sample countries, holding all regressors fixed at their sample values.
42Somewhat counterintuitively, the single-regressor probits also suggest that more extensive capital controls
and lower de facto financial openness were associated with a higher probability of entering an FCL.
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then the predictive ability of our single-regressor probits appears to be far from satisfactory.
By this standard, very few models perform better than the naive model that classifies all
countries as FCL non-participants. Exceptions include the probits of the country shares in
US exports, FDI and bank claims, which result in predicted FCL probabilities for Mexico
well in excess of 50%; and the probit of the two-component EMPI, which correctly predicts
Poland to be an FCL participant.43 That said, while the 50% probability rule has intuitive
appeal, it is not necessarily the most appropriate threshold in a unbalanced sample as ours,
where there are many more non-FCL than FCL countries (Greene, 2012). In the last two
columns of Appendix Table A3 we therefore evaluate the predictive ability of our probits
employing an alternative, sample-based cut-off, i.e., countries are classified as FCL partici-
pants if their predicted probabilities are at least as high as the proportion of FCL countries
actually observed in the sample (say, 3 out of 36 or 8.33% if external debt to GDP is the
regressor). According to this new rule, several models now correctly classify two or even all
three FCL countries, at the cost of an increased number of incorrectly classified non-FCL
countries. Ultimately, every choice for a classification threshold implies trade-offs between
making Type-1 errors (non-FCL countries classified as FCL) and Type-2 errors (FCL coun-
tries classified as non-FCL) (Greene, 2012). If we attach symmetric costs to both errors, the
overall predictive performance using the sample-based cut-off is strongest for the probits of
the trade, bank and FDI economic interest variables.
3.3.2 Multi-regressor probits
On the basis of the different criteria specified in Section 3.2.3 we select the following variables:
one-year averaged EMBI spreads, three-year averaged inflation, the share in total US exports,
political concessions to the US and the two-component EMPI. As can be seen from Appendix
Tables A2 and A3, the difference-in-means t-statistics, Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon z-statistics,
the single-regressor-probit coefficients, and the average marginal effects of these five variables
are all statistically significant at 10% (or lower) levels. Moreover, these variables are clearly
grounded in theory and the relevant empirical literature. Taken together, they are available
for 31 out of 37 sample countries (see Appendix Table A1). Other highly significant variables
with wider availability are excluded because of their high pairwise correlation with US export
shares (US FDI and bank claim shares) or EMBI spreads (overall country risk ratings).
Column (a) of Table 2 shows the results of the probit model that includes the five
selected variables. All variable coefficients have the expected sign and, with the exception of
inflation, are significant at the 20% level at the minimum. As in the single-regressor probits,
countries with lower EMBI spreads, lower inflation, a higher share in US exports, more severe
exchange market pressure, and countries that made more political concessions to the US had
a greater likelihood of entering into an FCL arrangement. Whereas the influence of the
two first variables is in line with supply-side arguments and the official qualification criteria,
exchange market pressure is clearly a demand-side factor. The share of country exports
in total US exports captures the relative exposure of US exporters to that country and is
therefore labelled a supply-side factor. As the dominant shareholder the US administration
has considerable room to exert influence on the IMF’s lending decisions so as to protect the
43Unsurprisingly, these are all variables in which Mexico or Poland lead the sample by a clear margin (see
Appendix Figure A1).
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interests of its exporting companies. In a similar vein, the political concessions variable can
be considered supply side; the US may well reward its foreign policy allies with favourable
votes in the IMF Executive Board. However, on the demand side, it is also conceivable
that countries that are more friendly towards US foreign policy feel less stigma and are
overall more comfortable in approaching the IMF for an FCL arrangement.44 The estimated
average marginal effects indicate that a 1% increase in the US exports share would increase
the probability of FCL entry with an average of 0.8%. A one standard deviation change
in the political concessions variable (+0.11) raises the likelihood with 4.4%. While these
effects are clearly smaller than in the single-regressor probits, they still seem economically
meaningful.
According to the pseudo R2, the explanatory power of the multi-regressor probit model
is considerably higher than that of any of the single-regressor models. More importantly, the
multi-regressor probit has superior predictive ability. If we employ 50% as our predicted prob-
ability threshold, the model succeeds in correctly classifying two out of three FCL (Poland
and Mexico) and all non-FCL countries. With a sample-based cut-off (here: 3/31 or 9.67%),
all three FCL countries are classified as such and only three non-FCL countries (Brazil, Peru
and Bulgaria) are incorrectly labelled FCL participants.45
Next, we subject the variables of the baseline probit model to two algorithms of step-
wise selection. The first algorithm starts with an empty model and iteratively adds the
most significant excluded variable, with possible re-exclusion of previously included vari-
ables. Conversely, the second algorithm takes the full model and iteratively drops the most
insignificant included variable, with possible re-inclusion of previously excluded variables.46
Taking 20% as the significance threshold level for inclusion/exclusion, both algorithms con-
verge to a model without the inflation variable. Column (b) of Table 2 shows that in such
a model the coefficients and average marginal effects are of the same order of magnitude
but statistically more significant than in the baseline model. The new model is very similar
in terms of explanatory power and predictive ability; employing a sample-based cut-off, all
three FCL countries are correctly classified and the number of false positives is now four
instead of three (the same non-FCL countries as before plus Hungary). When we set the
significance threshold level for baseline variable inclusion/exclusion at 10% or 5%, the se-
lection algorithms suggest a model including inflation but excluding the EMBI spread. The
estimated coefficients and marginal effects of such a model are again qualitatively similar
to those of the baseline model (Table 2, column (c)). Predictive power is slightly improved
under a sample-based classification cut-off, with only two misclassified non-FCL countries
44As Bird et al. (2015, p. 223) put it, “. . . there may be considerable self-selection on the demand side for
IMF programs; governments on good terms with the US may quickly turn to the Fund, while less favored
governments may not bother to approach the IMF expecting that an agreement will be opposed”.
45In the model of column (a) of Table 2 the predicted probabilities of FCL participation are 99.8% for
Poland, 98.4% for Mexico, and 13.6% for Colombia. This puts the latter behind Brazil (38.1%) and Peru
(18.2%) and just before Bulgaria (12.1%). Interestingly, a note by investment bank Barclays dated 30 March
2009 also lists Brazil and Peru among the potential candidates for an FCL (next to Mexico, Poland, Colombia
and a few others), based on a subjective scoring of countries on the nine official qualification criteria (Keller
et al., 2009).
46Note that these algorithms are not without problems and, again, do not necessarily result in the best
possible model given the list of possible variables (see e.g., Derksen and Keselman, 1992). Moreover, forward
and backward selection procedures may well result in different final models.
22
Table 2: Multi-regressor probits
(a) (b) (c)
Probit coef-
ficient
Average
marginal
effect
Probit coef-
ficient
Average
marginal
effect
Probit coef-
ficient
Average
marginal
effect
1-y average EMBI spread -0.0032+ -0.0002 -0.0051*** -0.0003+
[0.0024] [0.0002] [0.0015] [0.0002]
3-y average inflation -0.1394 -0.0071 -0.2496** -0.0128
[0.1940] [0.0118] [0.1036] [0.0109]
Share US exports 0.1637+ 0.0083*** 0.2109* 0.0110+ 0.1721** 0.0089***
[0.1011] [0.0025] [0.1135] [0.0076] [0.0861] [0.0033]
Political concessions to US 7.8400*** 0.3978+ 8.2064*** 0.4293+ 7.4575*** 0.3840+
[2.2456] [0.2819] [2.2029] [0.2927] [1.9559] [0.2566]
2-component EMPI 0.3204** 0.0163 0.2883*** 0.0151+ 0.3141*** 0.0162+
[0.1270] [0.0136] [0.0689] [0.0102] [0.0982] [0.0121]
Constant -1.6789* -1.7439* -2.1961***
[1.0146] [0.9307] [0.7750]
N 31 31 31 31 31 31
AIC 18.0669 16.1914 16.2523
BIC 26.6708 23.3614 23.4223
McFadden pseudo R2 0.6922 0.6859 0.6828
FCL countries correctly clas-
sified (50% cut-off)
2/3: POL,
MEX
2/3: POL,
MEX
2/3: POL,
MEX
Non-FCL countries correctly
classified (50% cut-off)
28/28 28/28 28/28
FCL countries correctly clas-
sified (sample-based cut-off)
3/3 3/3 3/3
Non-FCL countries correctly
classified (sample-based cut-
off)
25/28: not
BRA, PER,
BGR
24/28:
not BRA,
BGR, PER,
HUN
26/28: not
BRA, PER
Notes: Sample countries and ISO-3 codes as defined in Appendix Table A1 and variables as defined in Appendix Table A2.
Significance of probit coefficients based on Huber-White robust standard errors and significance of average marginal effects
based on delta-method standard errors. Number of correctly classified FCL and non-FCL countries based on two alternative
classification rules: in the first case a country is classified as FCL participant (non-participant) if predicted probability from
the model is greater (smaller) than 50%; in the second case a country is classified as FCL participant (non-participant) if
predicted probability from the model is greater (smaller) than proportion of FCL countries actually observed in sample.
+p < 0.2; ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
(Brazil and Peru).
In Appendix Table A4 we report a number of additional variations on the baseline
multi-regressor probit model. These confirm our main results.
Having addressed the selectivity of the FCL by looking into the most important cor-
relates of FCL participation, we now turn to an empirical evaluation of the FCL’s effective-
ness. In the remainder of the paper we attempt to shed light on the extent to which the
FCL arrangements of Mexico, Colombia and Poland have been successful in boosting market
confidence in these countries.
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4 How effective have FCL arrangements been?
4.1 Literature review
As explained in Section 2.1, the FCL is the IMF’s first genuine precautionary lending in-
strument. Rather than to address actual balance of payment problems, it was designed to
provide large, upfront financing to countries with strong fundamentals and ditto policies
that could nonetheless be vulnerable to adverse market conditions. Together with the strict
pre-set qualification criteria, the assured access to funds under the FCL serves to signal the
IMF’s confidence in the participating country’s policies and in its ability to take corrective
measures when needed; which in turn is meant to ease investors’ minds. As such, to eval-
uate the FCL’s success one should, above all, look into the impact on market perceptions
of its takers, as proxied, for example, by external financing costs (bond spreads) or capital
flows. The IMF’s factsheet on the FCL asserts that “[w]hile none of the three countries [i.e.,
Mexico, Colombia and Poland] have so far drawn down on these lines, the FCL has provided
valuable insurance to these countries and helped boost market confidence during the period
of heightened risks”.47 There is however surprisingly little systematic evidence to back up
this claim.
Most of the analysis of the macroeconomic-financial effects of the FCL has been con-
ducted by the IMF itself and can be found in its 2011 and 2014 review reports of the
instrument. IMF (2011) employs an event study whereby the individual EMBI spreads of
Mexico, Colombia and Poland are first regressed on the overall EMBI Global spread and
the residual is then examined in a ten-day window around the date of each country’s public
announcement of interest in the FCL. This exercise shows a drop in country-specific spreads
of about 30 basis points for Mexico, 20 basis points for Colombia and 15 basis points for
Poland in the immediate aftermath of countries’ announcement. IMF (2011) also finds that
exchange rate volatility in Mexico, Colombia and a number of potential FCL-qualifying coun-
tries declined around the time of the creation of the FCL; with further reductions for Mexico
and Colombia after their expression of interest in the FCL and for Poland after the approval
of its FCL in the Executive Board. IMF (2014) runs a set of panel regressions with country
fixed effects in a sample of emerging markets where the dependent variables are either EMBI
spreads or bond fund inflows and the independent variables include a dummy for having an
active FCL arrangement, next to global and country-specific controls. The results suggest
a sizeable and (generally) statistically significant decrease in spreads and increase in bond
flows in both FCL-participating and -qualifying countries. In separate panel regressions it
is also found that, whereas EMBI spreads increased overall in the four weeks following US
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke’s 22 May 2013 tapering speech, the rise in spreads
was lower in the three FCL countries than in their emerging market peers.
Conversely, after graphically comparing the EMBI spreads of Mexico, Colombia
and Poland with those of other emerging market economies with similar prior spreads,
Ferna´ndez Arias and Levy Yeyati (2012) find the benefits of the FCL to be muted and
short-lived, much more so than the influence of central bank swap lines with the US Federal
Reserve. Moreover, they show that in the months after the creation of the FCL the cumula-
47See http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/fcl.pdf.
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tive changes in EMBI spreads of FCL countries and potential qualifiers (defined as countries
with initial spreads lower than Colombia’s) are ‘indistinguishable’ from such spreads changes
in the other EMBI Global constituents. Ferna´ndez Arias and Levy Yeyati (2012) conclude
that the general improvement in bond spreads in the wake of the April 2009 London G20
summit should not be attributed to the availability of the FCL (or bilateral central bank
swaps for that matter). John and Knedlik (2011) and Marino and Volz (2012) present
simple graphs exhibiting narrowing sovereign and corporate bond spreads, exchange rate
appreciation and stock market recovery in the FCL countries following the approval of their
respective FCL arrangements, but are equally quick to stress the difficulties with interpreting
such trends as beneficial impacts of the FCL.
In view of the above we think there is ample room left for a more rigorous empirical
evaluation of the effectiveness of the FCL. First of all, none of the foregoing studies has at-
tempted to construct a proper counterfactual, i.e., what the bond spreads or other outcomes
for Mexico, Colombia and Poland would have been in case they had not concluded FCL
arrangements with the IMF. Indeed, FCL countries’ spreads are compared against EMBI
Global averages (IMF, 2011) or against countries with similar spreads at one point in time
(Ferna´ndez Arias and Levy Yeyati, 2012), without further examination of whether these are
valid comparisons. The panel regression approach of IMF (2014) at least controls for the
effect of other variables and time-invariant country-specific factors on outcomes, but the
composition of the counterfactual it produces remains implicit and could be distorted by
extrapolation outside the support of the data at hand. As explained in the next section, our
‘synthetic control’ approach aims to further objectivise and make explicit the selection of
comparator countries.48
Second, the focus of the assessments so far has principally been on the short-term effects
of the FCL, i.e., in the days/months right after the inception of the three arrangements.
However, a priori, there is no apparent reason why any immediate beneficial FCL effect
should be assumed to disappear over time (Ferna´ndez Arias and Levy Yeyati, 2012). One
would rather expect to see the FCL’s largest impact on market confidence during periods of
heightened global risks (IMF, 2014). Hence, we consider a much longer time horizon than
previous studies, encompassing among other events the intensification of the Eurozone crisis,
the US Federal Reserve’s ‘taper tantrum’ and the more recent fall in oil and other commodity
prices.
48A recent study by Newiak and Willems (2017) applies the same methodology to evaluate the impact
of Policy Support Instruments (PSIs), non-disbursing IMF instruments whose main purpose is to signal to
investors (and donors) the IMF’s endorsement of the participating countrys policies, on growth, inflation
and investment in seven African PSI countries. This enables Newiak and Willems (2017) to isolate the
contribution of IMF involvement (through advice, monitoring and approval) from the effects of direct financial
assistance. Since there have been no disbursements under the FCL arrangements either and given the FCLs
stated goal of boosting market confidence, our analysis can be seen in a similar light (although, unlike a PSI,
an FCL does imply direct access to financial assistance if needed).
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4.2 Empirical strategy and data description
4.2.1 Synthetic control methodology
To evaluate the effects of the FCL arrangements on Mexican, Colombian and Polish external
financing costs and capital inflows we adopt a counterfactual approach, using the so-called
‘synthetic control method’ developed and described in detail by Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003), Abadie et al. (2010) and Abadie et al. (2015).49 In essence, this method measures
the impact of a specific intervention (the agreement on an FCL arrangement in our case) as
the difference between the post-intervention outcomes (like bond spreads or capital inflows)
for the ‘treated’ country (one of the three FCL countries) and the same outcomes for a
‘synthetic control group’. The latter is constructed as a weighted combination of untreated
countries out of a larger ‘donor pool’ whose outcomes are deemed to be governed by the
same structural processes as the treated country (say, other emerging markets). Country
weights are chosen so that the characteristics of the synthetic control (both outcomes and
important determinants of those outcomes) over a pre-intervention period match as closely
as possible those of the treated country.
More formally, let yFCLit be the outcome variable of interest at time t if country i was
under an FCL arrangement and yNFCLit the outcome of interest for country i in the absence
of an FCL. The dynamic effect of the FCL, τit , is then given by:
τit = y
FCL
it − yNFCLit (2)
Further suppose we have a sample of N+1 countries, where country i = 1 is an FCL country
and countries i = 2 to i = N + 1 constitute the donor pool of N potential comparator (non-
FCL) countries. All countries are observed over T = T0 + T1 periods, with T0 and T1 the
number of pre- and post-FCL periods, respectively. The actually observed outcome yit for
country i at time t is therefore:
yit = y
NFCL
it + τitDit (3)
with
Dit =
{
1 if i = 1 and t > T0
0 otherwise
49Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) use their synthetic control method to evaluate the influence of ETA
terrorism on economic growth in the Basque Country, whereas Abadie et al. (2010) estimate the effect of a
Californian tobacco control programme on cigarette sales and Abadie et al. (2015) the growth impact of the
reunification of East and West Germany. Other notable studies applying the same methodology to topics
in international economics and beyond include Castaneda and Vargas (2012), Cavallo et al. (2013), duPont
and Noy (2015) and Pinotti (2015) on the economic costs of conflicts and natural disasters; Nannicini and
Billmeier (2011), Billmeier and Nannicini (2013) and Campos et al. (2014) on the consequences of economic
liberalisation and integration; and Jinjarak et al. (2013) and Chamon et al. (2015) on the effects of capital
controls and foreign exchange interventions.
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under the assumption that the FCL has neither an effect on outcomes before the signing of
the FCL arrangement in period T0 + 1, nor on non-FCL countries. Our aim is to estimate,
for t > T0:
τ1t = y
FCL
1t − yNFCL1t = y1t − yNFCL1t (4)
whereby y1t is observed but counterfactual y
NFCL
1t is not. Abadie et al. (2010) show how to
identify the vector (τ1T0+1, τ1T0+2, . . . τ1T ) when y
NFCL
it can be described by a general factor
model of the following form:
yNFCLit = δt + θtZi + λtµi + εit (5)
where δt is a time-varying factor common across countries; Zi is a vector of observed time-
varying and/or time-invariant covariates (unaffected by the FCL); θt is a vector of unknown
parameters; µi is a time-varying country-specific term; λt is a vector of unobserved common
factors; and error terms εit are zero-mean transitory shocks. Now define a generic N × 1
vector of weights W = (w2, w3, . . . wN+1)
′ with wi ≥ 0 for i = 2, 3, . . . N+1 and
∑N+1
i=2 wi = 1.
Each possible vector W corresponds to a potential synthetic control, i.e., a weighted average
of control countries for country i = 1. Also, consider y¯ki =
∑T0
s=1 ksyis to be a generic linear
combination of pre-FCL outcomes. Abadie et al. (2010) demonstrate that if one chooses
weights w∗2, w
∗
3, . . . w
∗
N+1 so that
N+1∑
i=2
w∗i y¯
k
i = y¯
k
1 (6)
and
N+1∑
i=2
w∗iZi = Z1 (7)
then
τˆ1t = y1t −
N+1∑
i=2
w∗i yit (8)
is an unbiased estimator of the dynamic effect of the FCL on country i = 1 (τ1t) for t =
T0 + 1, T0 + 2, . . . T . Generally, however, no weights exist such that equations (6) and (7)
hold exactly and the goal thus becomes to construct a synthetic control so that they hold
approximately. Abadie et al. (2010) propose minimising, in a non-parametric fashion and
with respect to W ∗, the distance between a vector of pre-FCL characteristics of the FCL
country and a vector of pre-FCL characteristics of the synthetic control. More specifically,
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if X1 is a vector of m pre-FCL characteristics of the FCL country and X0 a matrix that
collects the vectors of the same m pre-FCL characteristics of all N non-FCL countries in the
donor pool, the objective is to set W ∗ optimally so as to minimise
‖ X1 −X0W ‖V =
√
(X1 −X0W )′ V (X1 −X0W ) (9)
where V is a m × m symmetric and positive semidefinite matrix whose diagonal elements
reflect the relative importance attached to the pre-FCL variables in X0 and X1. There are
different possible ways of choosing V , including a subjective, theory-based assessment of the
predictive power for the outcome of interest of each of the pre-FCL characteristics. The most
intuitive (and most commonly employed) approach is to let the data speak and select the
V that minimises the root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE) of the outcome variable
over the pre-FCL periods, defined as:
RMSPE =
√√√√ 1
T0
T0∑
t=1
(
y1t −
N+1∑
i=2
w∗i yit
)2
(10)
In other words, we look for the V that delivers the best fit between the path of outcomes
for the FCL country and for the synthetic control before the FCL arrangement was agreed
upon.50 To facilitate comparison of the various synthetic control experiments we conduct
across countries and outcome variables we employ a normalised ‘fit index’, as suggested by
Adhikari and Alm (2016) and Newiak and Willems (2017):
Fit index =
√
1
T0
T0∑
t=1
(
y1t −
N+1∑
i=2
w∗i yit
)2
√
1
T0
T0∑
t=1
(y1t)
2
(11)
where the numerator is the standard pre-treatment RMSPE of equation (10) and the denom-
inator is the RMSPE derived from the zero-fit model, basically measuring the time variability
of the observed outcome of interest in the FCL country. This fit index has a very intuitive
interpretation. In case of a perfect fit the index would be zero, whereas an index of one or
more would indicate a particularly poor fit (Adhikari and Alm, 2016). Generally, however,
50An alternative approach, referred to by Abadie et al. (2015) as ‘cross-validation’, splits the pre-treatment
period into a so-called ‘training’ period and a ‘validation’ period and then proceeds in two steps. First, using
optimal donor unit weights W based on the training period values of the predictor variables, matrix V is
selected to minimise the out-of-sample RMSPE over the validation period. In a second step, the just-selected
V is used as an input to find a new set of optimal country weights W ′ that minimises the differences in
predictor variables between the treated unit and its synthetic control over the validation period. In spite of
some concerns with this approach (see Klo¨ßner et al., 2017), we have also run, as a robustness check, all our
synthetic control experiments using cross-validation. The estimated FCL effects are broadly similar to those
presented in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. All additional results are available from the authors upon request.
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the fit index yields a number q between zero and one, which is equivalent to a fit whereby
the difference in the outcome variable between the treated and synthetic control unit is q ×
100% in each pre-treatment period.
An interesting feature of the synthetic control method is that it makes explicit the
relative contributions of the different control units to the synthetic counterfactual, as well
as the similarities in characteristics between the treated country and the counterfactual
(allowing one to judge the degree to which equations (6) and (7) are satisfied). Whereas
standard regression estimators also (implicitly) rely on weighting untreated countries with
coefficients that sum to one, individual regression weights are unrestricted and can take on
negative values or values exceeding one (see Abadie et al., 2015). By restricting country
weights to lie between zero and one, the synthetic control estimator avoids extrapolation
outside the support of the data. It is a comparative case study methodology that can be
implemented without the need for large cross-sectional samples or a minimum frequency of
interventions. Furthermore, the synthetic control method extends the traditional difference-
in-differences panel estimator by permitting the effects of confounding, unobserved variables
to vary over time.51
There are, however, also limitations to this methodology (see Abadie, 2011, for a sum-
mary). Proper identification under the synthetic control estimator requires the effect of the
intervention to be large relative to the idiosyncratic volatility of the outcome variable. We
have no clear priors about the order of magnitude of potential FCL effects vis-a`-vis outcome
variations due to other factors, but remove excessive volatility by monthly averaging daily
bond spreads and by taking four-quarter moving sums of capital inflows (see further). Re-
stricting the donor pool to countries that resemble the FCL country in the determinants of
bond spreads and capital inflows and that were not subject to structural shocks to these
outcome variables over the sample period further limits the role of idiosyncratic volatility.
Removing (extreme) outliers from the donor pool also helps to mitigate interpolation biases,
which may be substantial when the synthetic control matches the FCL country by averaging
away large differences between the characteristics of the FCL country and of the non-FCL
countries constituting the control.
As stated above, the synthetic control estimator assumes that economic agents do
not act in anticipation of the intervention under study and that there are no spill-over
effects from the intervention to the comparator countries. In our case, anticipation effects
by investors are believed to have been limited, since the FCL arrangements of Mexico,
Colombia and Poland were signed shortly after the FCL instrument was created by the IMF.
Any remaining anticipation effects in the intervening periods should lead us to underestimate
51In fact, the synthetic control method can be regarded as a generalisation of the typical difference-in-
differences (DID) model. By taking time differences the DID estimator eliminates the effect of time-invariant
unobserved confounders on the outcome variable. However, it is not well-suited to deal with any remaining
time-varying unobserved heterogeneity (non-parallel trends in the outcomes of treated and control units), i.e.,
λtµi in the factor model described by equation (5). The synthetic control estimator overcomes this problem
by searching for a weighted combination of untreated units that fits, as closely as possible, the observed
pre-treatment characteristics and a long set of pre-treatment outcomes. Abadie et al. (2010) formally show
that, under relatively mild conditions, such a fit can only be achieved if the synthetic control matches well
both the observed covariates and the unobserved time-varying component of the treated unit’s outcome
variable. See also Athey and Imbens (2017), which situate synthetic control methods within the broader
family of econometric techniques used for policy evaluation.
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the true effect of the FCL. The IMF itself argues that the FCL had beneficial spill-overs to
a select number of countries beyond Mexico, Colombia and Poland that market participants
perceived as potential FCL qualifiers (on EMBI spreads, see IMF, 2011; on EMBI spreads
and bond fund flows, see IMF, 2014). To neutralise the impact of spill-overs we can exclude
particular countries from our donor pools. However, such exclusions could come at a cost.
Some of the non-FCL countries that are most likely to experience spill-over effects may be
those whose pre-FCL characteristics are closest to the characteristics of the FCL countries
(because that is why market participants regard them as FCL qualifiers). In our analysis we
will experiment with different donor pools. We keep in mind that in the presence of positive
spill-overs our synthetic controls will again result in lower-bound, conservative estimates of
the genuine effects of the FCL.
A last drawback of the synthetic control method is that the significance of the estimated
effects cannot be readily assessed based on standard, large-sample techniques of inference.
However, as demonstrated by Abadie et al. (2010), ‘placebo’ tests can be employed to make
inferences instead. The idea is to construct a separate synthetic control for each country
in the donor pool (as if it were the FCL country of interest), contrast the trajectories of
the observed and synthetic outcomes per country, and then compare the estimated placebo
treatment effects τit (for i = 2, 3, . . . N + 1) with the treatment effect τ1t for the actual FCL
country. Confidence that a large τ1t reflects the impact of the FCL would shrink if its size
falls well inside the distribution of placebo effects τit, obtained by artificially reassigning the
FCL arrangement to non-FCL countries.
4.2.2 Variable and donor pool selection
We use the synthetic control methodology to estimate the effect of the FCL arrangements
of Mexico, Colombia and Poland on two proxies of market confidence: first, external fi-
nancing costs as measured by monthly-averaged EMBI Global country stripped spreads (in
basis points); and second, four-quarter moving sums of gross capital inflows, expressed as a
percentage of GDP.52
Our choice of pre-treatment characteristics, which should ideally be strong predictors
of post-FCL outcomes, is informed by the literatures on the domestic determinants of bond
spreads and capital inflows (as well as data availability in our samples). As potential drivers
of EMBI spreads we select year-on-year real GDP growth, international reserves to GDP,
general government gross debt to GDP, and the current account balance to GDP (see, e.g.,
Dailami et al., 2008; Martinez et al., 2013; Csonto, 2014; Kennedy and Palerm, 2014); all
of which are monthly interpolated from yearly or quarterly data available in the World
Economic Outlook (WEO), International Financial Statistics (IFS) and Thomson Reuters
International Comparable Economics (TRICE) databases. Year-on-year real GDP growth,
the Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness and the EIU overall country risk rating, all
at quarterly frequency, are taken as drivers of capital inflows (see, e.g., Forbes and Warnock,
2012; Erce and Riera-Crichton, 2015). Similar to most other synthetic control studies and
52Gross capital inflows are defined as in Forbes and Warnock (2012) and Broner et al. (2013), i.e., the net
purchases of domestic assets by non-residents (or, the sum of all increases in direct investment, portfolio and
other investment liabilities). Information on gross asset trades by foreigners is not systematically available
from centralised balance of payments statistics.
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to improve the pre-treatment fit, we augment the lists of predictors with pre-FCL values of
the outcome variables. In the optimisation of objective function (9) we average the different
predictors over all pre-intervention periods.53
Balancing data availability on the outcome variables with the need to have a sufficient
number of pre-intervention periods, we begin our series of EMBI spreads and capital inflows,
for which RMSPEs should be minimised, in January 2005 and 2005Q4, respectively. April
2009 (2009Q2) is taken as the period in which the Mexican FCL arrangement was agreed
(i.e., the first post-intervention period or T0 + 1). The agreement on the FCL arrangements
of Colombia and Poland is dated May 2009 (also 2009Q2). We will compare the actual and
synthetic outcome variables all the way up to December 2014 (2014Q4) to study possible
longer-term effects.
For the construction of our donor pools we start again from the group of emerging
markets included in the EMBI Global at the time the FCL was introduced by the IMF, minus
the FCL countries themselves. Countries whose EMBI spreads (capital inflow data) could
not be retrieved for the whole January 2005-December 2014 (2005Q4-2014Q4) time span
are dropped. We further exclude Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Pakistan,
Ukraine and Venezuela from the EMBI spread donor pools, as all of these countries registered
spreads well in excess of 1000 basis points at some point in the sample period (largely because
of idiosyncratic reasons). For each FCL country and each outcome variable we conduct two
synthetic control experiments: one with the full donor pool as just described, and one with
the donor pool restricted to regional comparator countries only. Appendix Table A5 gives
the full composition of donor pools for our 12 synthetic controls.
4.3 Results from synthetic controls54
4.3.1 Effects of the FCL on EMBI spreads
Mexico
Figure 1 and Table 3 present the results of the synthetic control methodology applied to
Mexican EMBI spreads. Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows the trajectory of EMBI spreads for
Mexico and its synthetic counterpart constructed from the full donor pool. It is clear that
the synthetic Mexico, which is a combination of Chile (with weight 0.359), Brazil (0.293),
Hungary (0.201), South Africa (0.086) and El Salvador (0.061), mimics the real Mexico very
well in terms of pre-FCL spreads. Table 3 demonstrates that there is also a good match with
53Some studies employing synthetic controls, including Nannicini and Billmeier (2011) and Billmeier and
Nannicini (2013), use all pre-treatment values of the outcome variable as separate predictor variables in the
optimisation, to improve the fit (i.e., to minimise the RMSPE). We refrain from this practice as including the
entire pre-treatment path of outcomes renders all other covariates irrelevant and may lead to significant bias
in the estimator (see Kaul et al., 2016). Instead, we include averages of pre-treatment EMBI spreads/capital
inflows as one single predictor.
54All results were obtained using Stata’s synth command, written by Alberto Abadie and his collaborators.
We use the nested and allopt options, which deliver the most statistically robust results. Nested employs a
fully nested optimisation procedure that searches among all possible V s and sets of W for the best-fitting
convex combination of control countries. Allopt provides an extra robustness check in running the nested
optimisation for three different starting points of V (so as to increase chances of finding global rather than
local optima) and returns the best result (with the lowest RMSPE) of all three attempts.
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respect to spread predictors, although averaged reserves are somewhat higher in the synthetic
Mexico. Our estimate of the effect of the FCL on Mexican EMBI spreads is given by the
gap between actual Mexican spreads and their synthetic version, as visualised in panel (b) of
Figure 1. The Mexican spread first went about 37 basis points below its counterfactual when
the FCL was signed in April 2009, but then exceeded it by a small margin in the months
thereafter. From June 2010 onwards, however, actual Mexican spreads always remained
below the synthetic spreads. The largest gaps, around 70-80 basis points, are observed from
end-2011 to mid-2012, which coincides with an intensification of the Eurozone crisis. We
will check the significance of these effects when discussing our placebo tests (see further).
Figure 2 and the last column of Table 3 contain the synthetic control results for Mexican
EMBI spreads when the donor pool is restricted to Latin American countries. Again we see
a close pre-FCL match in spreads between Mexico and the synthetic control (which now
consists of Chile, Panama, Brazil and El Salvador, in decreasing order of weights). That
said, the pre-FCL RMSPE and fit index are somewhat (14%) higher than when the donor
pool was unrestricted and also the matching of covariates is less strong. Moreover, taking
the regional synthetic control results at face value, the Mexican FCL arrangement does not
seem to have lowered the country’s spreads; on the contrary, Mexican spreads are slightly
higher than the estimated synthetic spreads over the post-FCL period.
Figure 1: Evolution of and gap between EMBI spreads of Mexico and synthetic control (full
donor pool)
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Notes: Composition of full donor pool as presented in Appendix Table A5. Countries included in the synthetic control (and their
respective weights) are Chile (0.359), Brazil (0.293), Hungary (0.201), South Africa (0.086) and El Salvador (0.061). Predictor
variable weights (diagonal elements of V ) as listed in Appendix Table A6. Vertical dashed line indicates month first Mexican
FCL arrangement was agreed (April 2009).
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Figure 2: Evolution of and gap between EMBI spreads of Mexico and synthetic control
(regional donor pool)
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Notes: Composition of regional donor pool as presented in Appendix Table A5. Countries included in the synthetic control (and
their respective weights) are Chile (0.493), Panama (0.378), Brazil (0.067) and El Salvador (0.062). Predictor variable weights
(diagonal elements of V ) as listed in Appendix Table A6. Vertical dashed line indicates month first Mexican FCL arrangement
was agreed (April 2009).
Table 3: Pre-FCL match of EMBI spreads and covariates between Mexico and synthetic
controls (full and regional donor pools)
Mexico Synthetic Mexico Synthetic Mexico
(full donor pool) (regional donor pool)
EMBI spread (bps) 186.67 186.68 188.91
Real GDP growth (%) 3.31 4.45 6.41
Reserves (% of GDP) 8.29 12.05 10.25
Public debt (% of GDP) 39.29 39.28 31.55
Current account balance (% of GDP) -1.27 -1.43 -1.99
RMSPE 11.70 13.34
Fit index 0.06 0.06
Notes: Composition of full and regional donor pools as presented in Appendix Table A5. Countries included in the synthetic
controls (and their respective weights) same as in Figures 1 and 2. Variables as defined in Section 4.2.2. Values shown for
EMBI spreads and covariates are averages over January 2005 - March 2009. RMSPE and fit index as defined in Section
4.2.1.
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Colombia
Applied to the full donor pool the synthetic control algorithm has greater difficulties with
approximating Colombia’s EMBI spreads before its first FCL arrangement, although on
average spread covariates are very similar (see Figure 3 and Table 4).55 Observed spreads
are up to 125 basis points lower than synthetic spreads in the years following Colombia’s
signing of its FCL, but so are they in the months running up to the global financial and
economic crisis. It therefore seems not much can be learned from this particular experiment.
Restricting the donor pool to the Latin American region enables a more successful
matching of Colombian EMBI spreads; the fit index is reduced by two-thirds to 7% (see
Figure 4 and Table 4), approaching those of the Mexican synthetic controls (in Table 3).56
With the exception of public debt, average values of the covariates are very similar between
Colombia and its synthetic control composed of Brazil, Panama, El Salvador, Chile and
Peru (again in decreasing order of weights). The results suggest a divergence between actual
and synthetic spreads, but only from mid 2010 onwards. The estimated effect of the FCL
goes up to 80-90 basis points around mid-2012 and early 2014.
Table 4: Pre-FCL match of EMBI spreads and covariates between Colombia and synthetic
controls (full and regional donor pools)
Colombia Synthetic Colombia Synthetic Colombia
(full donor pool) (regional donor pool)
EMBI spread (bps) 263.03 263.11 262.8
Real GDP growth (%) 5.40 5.41 5.40
Reserves (% of GDP) 10.03 11.19 10.02
Public debt (% of GDP) 35.48 35.47 54.26
Current account balance (% of GDP) -2.14 -2.12 -2.14
RMSPE 64.43 20.41
Fit index 0.22 0.07
Notes: Composition of full and regional donor pools as presented in Appendix Table A5. Countries included in the synthetic
controls (and their respective weights) same as in Figures 3 and 4. Variables as defined in Section 4.2.2. Values shown for EMBI
spreads and covariates are averages over January 2005 - April 2009. RMSPE and fit index as defined in Section 4.2.1.
55The fact that 14 out of 16 countries in the donor pool get assigned positive but (mostly) very small
weights testifies to the difficulty of matching in this case.
56In theory, optimisation in the full set of donor pool countries, which encompasses the regional donor
pool, should result in a better fit (i.e., a lower RMPSE and fit index). In practice this is not always the case,
however (see also Billmeier and Nannicini, 2013, p. 991, Tables 8-9), because of the relatively challenging
optimisation problem the synthetic control methodology postulates (which involves the optimisation of both
country and variable weights; see Section 4.2.1). According to preliminary work by Becker and Klo¨ßner
(2017), the optimising algorithms designed by Alberto Abadie and his collaborators cannot guarantee finding
the true global optimum. Here the synthetic control results for Colombia’s full donor pool thus represent a
local optimum.
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Figure 3: Evolution of and gap between EMBI spreads of Colombia and synthetic control
(full donor pool)
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Notes: Composition of full donor pool as presented in Appendix Table A5. Countries included in the synthetic control (and
their respective weights) are Turkey (0.511), Indonesia (0.216), Chile (0.212), El Salvador (0.047) and ten other countries (with
weights of maximum 0.003). Predictor variable weights (diagonal elements of V ) as listed in Appendix Table A6. Vertical
dashed line indicates month first Colombian FCL arrangement was agreed (May 2009).
Figure 4: Evolution of and gap between EMBI spreads of Colombia and synthetic control
(regional donor pool)
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Notes: Composition of regional donor pool as presented in Appendix Table A5. Countries included in the synthetic control (and
their respective weights) are Brazil (0.491), Panama (0.237), El Salvador (0.168), Chile (0.062) and Peru (0.041). Predictor
variable weights (diagonal elements of V ) as listed in Appendix Table A6. Vertical dashed line indicates month first Colombian
FCL arrangement was agreed (May 2009).
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Poland
In a full donor pool the synthetic control algorithm approximates Polish EMBI spreads with
a weighted average of Chinese (0.613) and Hungarian (0.387) spreads. Whereas the matching
of pre-FCL spreads appears to be relatively close (with a fit index of 13%), differences in other
spread predictors between Poland and its synthetic version are considerable (see Figure 5
and Table 5). Due to the inclusion of China, average growth, reserves and the current
account balance of the synthetic Poland are much higher than those of actual Poland, which
could complicate the comparison of post-FCL outcomes (if growth, reserves and the current
account position are indeed important predictors of EMBI spreads in the post-FCL period).
We see Polish spreads dive below their estimated counterfactual mid-2010. The gap reaches
its maximum (of more than 150 basis points) early 2012, when the Eurozone crisis came to
a boiling point.
For the regional donor pool of Poland we are restricted by data availability and consider
only Hungary, Turkey (emerging European countries) and Russia (a CIS country) as potential
controls. The algorithm selects Hungary as a single comparator. Matching of pre-FCL
spreads is very poor, however (especially during the peak of the global crisis), so we discard
the estimated effects (Figure 6 and Table 5).
Figure 5: Evolution of and gap between EMBI spreads of Poland and synthetic control (full
donor pool)
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Notes: Composition of full donor pool as presented in Appendix Table A5. Countries included in the synthetic control (and
their respective weights) are China (0.613) and Hungary (0.387). Predictor variable weights (diagonal elements of V ) as listed
in Appendix Table A6. Vertical dashed line indicates month first Polish FCL arrangement was agreed (May 2009).
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Figure 6: Evolution of and gap between EMBI spreads of Poland and synthetic control
(regional donor pool)
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Notes: Composition of regional donor pool as presented in Appendix Table A5. Hungary is the only control country (with a
weight of 1). Predictor variable weights (diagonal elements of V ) as listed in Appendix Table A6. Vertical dashed line indicates
month first Polish FCL arrangement was agreed (May 2009).
Table 5: Pre-FCL match of EMBI spreads and covariates between Poland and synthetic
controls (full and regional donor pools)
Poland Synthetic Poland Synthetic Poland
(full donor pool) (regional donor pool)
EMBI spread (bps) 100.43 111.01 133.42
Real GDP growth (%) 5.09 7.84 2.56
Reserves (% of GDP) 18.32 31.39 17.85
Public debt (% of GDP) 46.47 45.69 65.04
Current account balance (% of GDP) -4.23 2.42 -6.84
RMSPE 17.55 66.09
Fit index 0.13 0.50
Notes: Composition of full and regional donor pools as presented in Appendix Table A5. Countries included in the synthetic
controls (and their respective weights) same as in Figures 5 and 6. Variables as defined in Section 4.2.2. Values shown
for EMBI spreads and covariates are averages over January 2005 - April 2009. RMSPE and fit index as defined in Section
4.2.1.
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4.3.2 Effects of the FCL on gross capital inflows
Mexico
Figure 7 and Table 6 show the synthetic control outcomes for gross capital inflows into
Mexico when considering the full donor pool. Pre-FCL capital inflows into synthetic Mexico,
a weighted average of Sri Lanka (0.542), Chile (0.280) and Peru (0.178), fit the observed
capital inflows reasonably well (despite the fit index of 23% being significantly higher than
the corresponding indices in the EMBI spread synthetic controls). And with the exception
of real GDP growth, the average pre-FCL values of capital flow predictors are very similar
too between Mexico and its synthetic version. The effects of the FCL on capital inflows
are estimated to be positive between end-2009 and end-2011 (up to an extra five percentage
points of GDP in 2010Q4) and, surprisingly, negative between end-2011 and end-2013. The
significance of these effects will again be evaluated against placebo effects (see further).
Restricting the donor pool to the Latin American region results in a considerably
worse match of pre-FCL capital flows (with an increase in the fit index of almost 50%)
(see Figure 8 and Table 6). We still observe the largest positive effects of the FCL over
2010-2011, but no longer the unexpected negative effects over 2012-2013.
Figure 7: Evolution of and gap between gross capital inflows into Mexico and synthetic
control (full donor pool)
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Notes: Composition of full donor pool as presented in Appendix Table A5. Countries included in the synthetic control (and
their respective weights) are Sri Lanka (0.542), Chile (0.280) and Peru (0.178). Predictor variable weights (diagonal elements of
V ) as listed in Appendix Table A7. Vertical dashed line indicates quarter first Mexican FCL arrangement was agreed (2009Q2).
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Figure 8: Evolution of and gap between gross capital inflows into Mexico and synthetic
control (regional donor pool)
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Notes: Composition of regional donor pool as presented in Appendix Table A5. Countries included in the synthetic control
(and their respective weights) are Ecuador (0.434), El Salvador (0.358) and Brazil (0.208). Predictor variable weights (diagonal
elements of V ) as listed in Appendix Table A7. Vertical dashed line indicates quarter first Mexican FCL arrangement was
agreed (2009Q2).
Table 6: Pre-FCL match of gross capital inflows and covariates between Mexico and synthetic
controls (full and regional donor pools)
Mexico Synthetic Mexico Synthetic Mexico
(full donor pool) (regional donor pool)
4-quarter gross capital inflows (% of GDP) 4.26 4.26 4.26
Real GDP growth (%) 2.47 6.01 3.77
Capital account openness index 0.70 0.70 0.91
Overall country risk rating 35.31 41.5 50.84
RMSPE 1.01 1.50
Fit index 0.23 0.34
Notes: Composition of full and regional donor pools as presented in Appendix Table A5. Countries included in the synthetic controls
(and their respective weights) same as in Figures 7 and 8. Variables as defined in Section 4.2.2. Values shown for capital inflows
and covariates are averages over 2005Q4 - 2009Q1. RMSPE and fit index as defined in Section 4.2.1.
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Colombia
Similar as with Colombia’s EMBI spreads the synthetic control algorithm has some diffi-
culties with finding a good weighted country combination that closely tracks Colombia’s
pre-FCL capital inflows, in spite of very similar average values for the covariates and an
acceptable (20%) overall fit index (see Figure 9 and Table 7).57 The results indicate that
capital inflows into Colombia exceeded their estimated counterfactual for most of the post-
FCL quarters, except for 2012Q3-2013Q2, with peaks up to 3.5 percentage points of GDP.
The matching worsens in the regional donor pool (with a 40% higher fit index),
where a weighted combination of Argentina and Chile is selected to approximate pre-FCL
Colombia (see Figure 10 and Table 7). Nevertheless, the estimated effects of the FCL on
Colombian capital inflows follow a similar trajectory as in the full donor pool experiment.
Figure 9: Evolution of and gap between gross capital inflows into Colombia and synthetic
control (full donor pool)
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Notes: Composition of full donor pool as presented in Appendix Table A5. Countries included in the synthetic control (and
their respective weights) are Sri Lanka (0.244), Chile (0.197), South Africa (0.185), Pakistan (0.117), Philippines (0.065),
China (0.035), Brazil (0.031), Argentina (0.022) and 12 other countries (with weights of maximum 0.017). Predictor variable
weights (diagonal elements of V ) as listed in Appendix Table A7. Vertical dashed line indicates quarter first Colombian FCL
arrangement was agreed (2009Q2).
57In this case all countries in the donor pool get assigned (mostly small) positive weights.
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Figure 10: Evolution of and gap between gross capital inflows into Colombia and synthetic
control (regional donor pool)
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Notes: Composition of regional donor pool as presented in Appendix Table A5. Countries included in the synthetic control
(and their respective weights) are Argentina (0.686) and Chile (0.314). Predictor variable weights (diagonal elements of V ) as
listed in Appendix Table A7. Vertical dashed line indicates quarter first Colombian FCL arrangement was agreed (2009Q2).
Table 7: Pre-FCL match of gross capital inflows and covariates between Colombia and
synthetic controls (full and regional donor pools)
Colombia Synthetic Colombia Synthetic Colombia
(full donor pool) (regional donor pool)
4-quarter gross capital inflows (% of GDP) 6.26 6.29 6.07
Real GDP growth (%) 5.07 5.09 5.32
Capital account openness index 0.48 0.48 0.50
Overall country risk rating 43.60 43.79 44.33
RMSPE 1.29 1.79
Fit index 0.20 0.28
Notes: Composition of full and regional donor pools as presented in Appendix Table A5. Countries included in the synthetic controls (and
their respective weights) same as in Figures 9 and 10. Variables as defined in Section 4.2.2. Values shown for capital inflows and covariates
are averages over 2005Q4 - 2009Q1. RMSPE and fit index as defined in Section 4.2.1.
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Poland
Pre-FCL capital inflows into Poland are reasonably well matched by a synthetic control of
inflows into South Africa, Chile, Bulgaria and China (and a number of other countries with
very small weights), and so are Poland’s other pre-FCL characteristics (see Figure 11 and
Table 8). The estimated effect of the FCL on capital inflows is positive from 2009Q3 to
2011Q4 and large, up to 11 percentage points of GDP in 2011Q1 and 2001Q2. From 2012
onwards, in the wake of the Eurozone crisis, the differences between observed and synthetic
Polish capital inflows are estimated as being negative, albeit smaller in absolute value than
the earlier positive differences.
The regional donor pool of Poland is limited to Bulgaria, Hungary (both emerging
Europe), Kazakhstan and Russia (both CIS), again due to data availability. Russia (0.875)
and Bulgaria (0.125) are now selected to form the regional synthetic control for Poland. The
result is a much improved pre-FCL fit (with a fit index that is reduced by half, to 10%) (see
Figure 12 and Table 8). Again a large positive FCL effect is estimated for the periods up to
early 2012. The subsequent negative effects are less pronounced than in the case of the full
donor pool.
Figure 11: Evolution of and gap between gross capital inflows into Poland and synthetic
control (full donor pool)
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(b)
Notes: Composition of full donor pool as presented in Appendix Table A5. Countries included in the synthetic control (and
their respective weights) are South Africa (0.444), Chile (0.267), Bulgaria (0.172), China (0.104) and 8 other countries (with
weights of maximum 0.003). Predictor variable weights (diagonal elements of V ) as listed in Appendix Table A7. Vertical
dashed line indicates quarter first Polish FCL arrangement was agreed (2009Q2).
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Figure 12: Evolution of and gap between gross capital inflows into Poland and synthetic
control (regional donor pool)
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Notes: Composition of regional donor pool as presented in Appendix Table A5. Countries included in the synthetic control
(and their respective weights) are Russia (0.875) and Bulgaria (0.125). Predictor variable weights (diagonal elements of V ) as
listed in Appendix Table A7. Vertical dashed line indicates quarter first Polish FCL arrangement was agreed (2009Q2).
Table 8: Pre-FCL match of gross capital inflows and covariates between Poland and synthetic
controls (full and regional donor pools)
Poland Synthetic Poland Synthetic Poland
(full donor pool) (regional donor pool)
4-quarter gross capital inflows (% of GDP) 13.34 13.35 13.40
Real GDP growth (%) 5.23 5.22 5.43
Capital account openness index 0.45 0.51 0.47
Overall country risk rating 36.31 36.24 43.12
RMSPE 2.83 1.47
Fit index 0.20 0.10
Notes: Composition of full and regional donor pools as presented in Appendix Table A5. Countries included in the synthetic
controls (and their respective weights) same as in Figures 11 and 12. Variables as defined in Section 4.2.2. Values shown for capital
inflows and covariates are averages over 2005Q4 - 2009Q1. RMSPE and fit index as defined in Section 4.2.1.
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4.3.3 Placebo tests
To further investigate whether the estimated effects of the FCL on Mexican, Colombian and
Polish EMBI spreads and capital inflows are statistically significant or rather coincidental,
we run a series of placebo experiments. As described above, placebos for the FCL’s effects
on FCL participants are constructed by iteratively applying the synthetic control method
to all other, non-FCL countries in the donor pool.58 If the post-FCL gaps between actual
and synthetic EMBI spreads/capital inflows for Mexico/Colombia/Poland, estimated in the
previous sections, are large relative to the corresponding gaps for countries that did not enter
into FCL arrangements, then this would strengthen our interpretation of the first gaps as
evidence of the effects of the FCL.
Figures 13 and 14 collect the results of our placebo tests. We conduct such tests for the
cases where the closest matching between actual and synthetic pre-FCL outcome variables
was achieved (i.e., where we observed the lowest pre-FCL RMSPEs and fit indices): Mexican
and Polish EMBI spreads with the full donor pool; Colombian spreads with the regional donor
pool; Mexican and Colombian capital inflows with the full donor pool; and Polish capital
inflows with the regional donor pool. As Abadie et al. (2010) point out, for the purpose of
evaluating the relative rarity of large post-intervention gaps it makes little sense to compare
between cases with a good pre-intervention fit and placebos with a very poor fit. Therefore,
we exclude from Figures 13 and 14 the placebos that have a pre-FCL RMSPE that is much
larger than the pre-FCL RMSPE of the synthetic control for the FCL country in question.59
Panel (a) of Figure 13 indicates that the estimated effects of the FCL on Mexican
EMBI spreads are not significant, as we find several placebo effects of similar or even greater
magnitude when assigning the FCL intervention to the non-FCL countries in the donor
pool. Especially Panama and South Africa exhibit large placebo effects, which are unlikely
to be just the result of beneficial spill-overs from the availability of the FCL. Conversely,
from panel (b) of Figure 13 it seems that the downward effect of the FCL on Colombian
spreads from mid-2010 onwards is comparatively large, emulated only by the placebo effect
on Panamanian spreads. The small number of regional placebos makes it however difficult
to properly evaluate the significance of this result. Panel (c) shows that the estimated effects
on Polish spreads are also relatively large, but not before early 2011. Hence there is a real
possibility that other factors, like policy actions taken in the wake of the Eurozone crisis,
may account for this ‘FCL effect’.60
58The donor pools for each of the placebo tests again exclude Mexico, Colombia and Poland, so that
the synthetic non-FCL countries are composed of other non-FCL countries only (following Abadie and
Gardeazabal, 2003). Leaving the FCL countries in the placebo donor pools produces similar results.
59To balance similarity in the degree of fit with keeping sufficient placebos for comparison, we define
‘much larger’ here as a pre-FCL RMSPE that is more than four times larger than that of the synthetic
control for the FCL country in question. Excluding placebos with high fit indices (say, exceeding 20%) gives
qualitatively similar results.
60Of course, it could be that the FCL arrangement enabled the Polish authorities to implement such policy
actions.
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Figure 13: EMBI spread gaps for FCL countries and placebo gaps
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Notes: Panels show the gaps between actual EMBI spreads and EMBI spreads in synthetic controls, for FCL countries (black
lines) and their placebos, i.e., non-FCL donor pool countries (grey lines). Panels (a) and (c) use full donor pool and panel
(b) regional donor pool, compositions of which are presented in Appendix Table A5. In each panel, placebos with pre-FCL
RMSPE larger than four times pre-FCL RMSPE of synthetic control for FCL country are excluded.
Panel (a) of Figure 14 demonstrates that the estimated effects of the FCL on gross
capital inflows into Mexico do not stand out particularly when compared to the placebo
effects for donor pool countries. Even at their peak in 2010Q4-2011Q1 the Mexican effects
are easily surpassed by the placebo effects for Chile and Vietnam and similar to those for
Peru, Venezuela and the Philippines. Similar conclusions can be drawn for Colombia from
panel (b), although in 2009Q2, when the first FCL was agreed, the estimated effect on
Colombian capital inflows is on a par with the placebo effects for Chile, Uruguay, Indonesia
and Pakistan and exceeds all 14 other placebos shown. Finally, panel (c) emphasises the
magnitude of the estimated effects of the FCL on Polish capital inflows. Unfortunately only
one placebo effect with a reasonable pre-FCL fit (that of Bulgaria) could be estimated for
the regional donor pool. That said, the timing of the effects on Polish capital inflows, right
after the country’s entry into an FCL agreement, makes that they can be more plausibly
attributed to the FCL than the effects estimated for Polish EMBI spreads.
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Figure 14: Gross capital inflow gaps for FCL countries and placebo gaps
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Notes: Panels show the gaps between actual gross capital inflows and gross capital inflows in synthetic controls, for FCL
countries (black lines) and their placebos, i.e., non-FCL donor pool countries (grey lines). Panels (a) and (b) use full donor
pool and panel (c) regional donor pool, compositions of which are presented in Appendix Table A5. In each panel, placebos
with pre-FCL RMSPE larger than four times pre-FCL RMSPE of synthetic control for FCL country are excluded.
All in all, the results of our synthetic controls suggest that the FCL has had some but
not spectacular effects on the bond spreads and gross capital inflows of its recipients. The
beneficial effects on Colombian and Polish spreads seem to have been significant, but only
with a considerable lag. This begs the question whether other, post-FCL factors played a
role too. The positive effects on gross capital inflows into Colombia and Poland we uncovered
were more immediate but either disappeared rather quickly over time (Colombia) or could
not be tested for significance (Poland). At the minimum, the evidence shows that there have
been no negative market reactions (in net terms) to Mexico, Colombia or Poland’s entry into
FCL arrangements, unlike what some country authorities that were reluctant to apply for
an FCL may have feared.
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5 Concluding remarks
To better fulfil its role in the GFSN in the wake of the global financial crisis, the IMF in March
2009 overhauled its lending framework. One of the most remarkable innovations was the
introduction of the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), the IMF’s first genuine precautionary lending
instrument that allocates large amounts of resources to countries with strong fundamentals
and solid policy track records. Other than with instruments the IMF created in the past,
countries that decide to apply and, eventually, are deemed to qualify for the FCL can draw
on it at their own discretion (should a financing need emerge) and without having to agree
to an adjustment programme or other ex post conditionality.
This paper has provided an empirical evaluation of the FCL’s selectivity and effective-
ness. First, starting from the observation that to date only Mexico, Colombia and Poland
have subscribed to FCL arrangements, we have attempted to identify which factors explain
these three countries’ participation. Our probit analysis has shown that both demand- and
supply-side variables mattered, although one should be careful in making causal claims. On
the side of the prospective applicants, we have found that exchange market pressure in the
run-up to the FCL’s creation is correlated positively with the probability of entry into an
FCL arrangement. Ceteris paribus, such pressures increase countries’ demand for foreign
exchange, from the IMF or other sources. On the other hand, also initially lower bond
spreads, lower inflation, a higher share in US exports and a higher propensity of making po-
litical concessions to the US (the IMF’s largest shareholder) were associated with a greater
likelihood of obtaining an FCL arrangement. The influence of bond spreads and inflation
corresponds with the official qualification criteria against which IMF staff is supposed to
assess the eligibility of FCL applicants. The US exports share and political concessions vari-
ables too fit supply-side arguments touted by a large empirical literature on IMF lending,
i.e., that the US exerts (explicit or implicit) influence on IMF lending decisions to protect its
(exporters’) economic interests and rewards foreign policy allies with favourable Executive
Board votes. That said, the political concessions variable may be demand-related as well.
Possibly, countries that are more friendly towards US foreign policy feel less stigma and are
overall more comfortable in approaching the IMF (widely regarded as a US/G7-dominated
institution) for an FCL.
Second, we have evaluated the extent to which the FCL arrangements of Mexico,
Colombia and Poland have delivered on their promise of boosting market confidence in their
respective users. More specifically, we have employed the synthetic control method, a coun-
terfactual approach, to assess the longer-term effects of the FCL on the three countries’
EMBI spreads and gross capital inflows. The outcomes of our counterfactual exercises have
pointed to some but generally not spectacular beneficial effects, which in the case of spreads
became visible only a considerable time after the respective FCLs were first approved. These
lags may be the result of the FCL’s effectiveness depending on the changing external envi-
ronment and/or reflect the influence of other, idiosyncratic factors (such as post-FCL policy
changes) which we do not capture.
Possible avenues for further research include using a similar approach to estimate the
effects of the FCL on other variables, such as exchange rates, international reserves, do-
mestic/corporate bond spreads, or subcomponents of overall capital inflows. One could also
apply the same methodology to evaluate the impact of the PCL/PLL. Finally, it would be
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interesting to study the behaviour of bond spreads, capital flows and other indicators of
market confidence once Mexico, Colombia and/or Poland decide to exit their current FCL
arrangements.
At this point, we believe there are two main policy implications one can draw from our
analysis. First of all, as we do not find evidence of negative market reactions to countries
accessing the FCL, at least not in terms of EMBI spreads or capital inflows, any economic
stigma that prevents eligible countries from applying for an FCL arrangement seems unwar-
ranted. The IMF may want to stress this more in its communication about the FCL. Second,
however, the apparent link of FCL participation with US economic and political interests
seems not conducive to overcoming political stigma. Even if, in reality, Mexico, Colombia
and Poland’s entry into FCL arrangements had more to do with these ‘US-oriented’ coun-
tries feeling less inhibited in approaching the IMF than with US favouritism, it may not
be perceived as such by other member countries. If the IMF wants to increase its clout
in the GFSN by widening the appeal of and actual participation in precautionary lending
instruments such as the FCL, it will have to engage in more and better-targeted outreach
activities. For example, IMF staff could engage in in-depth discussions with country au-
thorities on what exactly holds them back to seek precautionary IMF support, even if no ex
post conditionality applies to that support. Perhaps a good place to start such discussions
would be member countries that are less obviously aligned with the US in terms of economic
relations and foreign policy.
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Appendix Tables and Figures
Table A1: EMBI Global sample countries for FCL selectivity analysis
Country ISO-3 code Baseline multi-regressor probit Ongoing IMF arrangement (other than FCL)
as of 23 March 2009?
FCL
Mexico MEX X No
Poland POL X No
Colombia COL X No
Non-FCL
Argentina ARG No
Belize BLZ No
Brazil BRA X No
Bulgaria BGR X No
Chile CHL X No
China CHN No
Dominican Republic DOM X No
Ecuador ECU No
Egypt EGY X No
El Salvador SLV X Yes, SBA approved on 15 January 2009
Gabon GAB X Yes, SBA approved on 7 May 2007
Georgia GEO Yes, SBA approved on 15 September 2008
Ghana GHA X No
Hungary HUN X Yes, SBA approved on 6 November 2008
Indonesia IDN X No
Jamaica JAM X No
Kazakhstan KAZ X No
Lebanon LBN X No
Malaysia MYS X No
Pakistan PAK X Yes, SBA approved on 24 November 2008
Panama PAN X No
Peru PER X No
Philippines PHL X No
Russia RUS X No
Serbia SRB X Yes, SBA approved on 16 January 2009
South Africa ZAF X No
Sri Lanka LKA X No
Trinidad and Tobago TTO No
Tunisia TUN X No
Turkey TUR X No
Ukraine UKR X Yes, SBA approved on 5 November 2008
Uruguay URY X No
Venezuela VEN X No
Vietnam VNM X No
Source: JP Morgan; IMF Financial Data.
Note: Listed countries are those included in JP Morgan EMBI Global as of end-March 2009, excluding Iraq. Third column indicates which countries are included in baseline
multi-regressor probits of Table 2. SBA is Stand-By Arrangement.
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Appendix Table A4 reports additional variations on the baseline multi-regressor probit model
of Table 2. In columns (a) and (b) of Table A4, we replace in turn US export shares with
US bank claim shares and EMBI spreads with the EIU’s overall country risk rating. The
coefficient of US bank claim shares has the expected sign but is not significant. The risk
rating’s coefficient has a counterintuitive positive sign but is again not significant. Replacing
the EMBI spreads with the risk rating raises the significance of the inflation variable, prob-
ably because of the remaining collinearity between spreads and inflation. All other results
in columns (a) and (b) are similar to those of the baseline model. Column (c) of Table A4
excludes from our baseline sample countries that had ongoing IMF arrangements when the
FCL was launched (see Appendix Table A1). It could be argued that chances that those
countries would qualify for the FCL were very slim. The resulting estimates are again close
to those of the baseline model. Lastly, in columns (d) and (e) we check the sensitivity of
our results to the estimation methodology by re-estimating the baseline model using logistic
regression and OLS. The average marginal effects of the baseline probit and logit are very
much alike. Also the marginal effects of the linear probability model (LPM) (equal to the
model’s coefficients) are of the same order as in the probit, with the exception of the US
export share effect (which is much larger in the LPM).61
Whereas the predictive abilities of the models in columns (a) to (d) of Appendix Table
A4 are very much in line with the baseline model, the LPM in column (e), which has the
disadvantage that it does not constrain predicted values to the 0-1 interval, performs less
well in this respect.62 When the probability cut-off is fixed at 50%, the LPM classifies only
Mexico as an FCL country; with a sample-based cut-off Mexico, Poland and Colombia are
all three identified as FCL participants, but so are ten non-FCL countries.63
61Unlike in probit and logit estimation where the marginal effects vary over the different sample countries
(see footnote 41), the LPM forces the marginal effects to be the same for every country.
62For a number of sample countries the probabilities predicted by the LPM are indeed negative.
63Nonetheless, in the LPM Colombia’s predicted probability of FCL participation (19.8%) is the fourth
highest in the sample, surpassed only by the probabilities of Mexico (96.6%), Poland (44.2%) and Brazil
(34.4%).
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Table A5: Donor pool composition for synthetic controls
EMBI spread synthetic controls Capital inflow synthetic controls
Mexico Colombia Poland Mexico Colombia Poland
Non-FCL comparators Full Regional Full Regional Full Regional Full Regional Full Regional Full Regional
Argentina X X X X X
Brazil X X X X X X X X X X
Bulgaria X X X X
Chile X X X X X X X X X X
China X X X X X X
Ecuador X X X X X
Egypt X X X
El Salvador X X X X X X X X X X
Hungary X X X X X X X X
Indonesia X X X X X X
Kazakhstan X X X X
Lebanon X X X
Malaysia X X X
Pakistan X X X
Panama X X X X X X X X X X
Peru X X X X X X X X X X
Philippines X X X X X X
Russia X X X X X X X X
South Africa X X X X X X
Sri Lanka X X X
Turkey X X X X
Uruguay X X X X X X X X X X
Venezuela X X X X X
Vietnam X X X
Notes: Sample constructed from countries included in JP Morgan EMBI Global as of end-March 2009, excluding countries with incomplete EMBI spread (capital inflow) data over
January 2005-December 2014 (2005Q4-2014Q4) and FCL countries themselves. Composition of full and regional donor pools for synthetic controls shown separately for each FCL
country and by outcome variable (EMBI spreads or capital inflows).
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Table A6: Predictor variable weights in EMBI spreads synthetic controls
Synthetic controls
Mexico Colombia Poland
Variables Full Regional Full Regional Full Regional
EMBI spread (bps) 0.974 0.699 0.885 0.067 0.984 0.832
Real GDP growth (%) 0.000 0.015 0.114 0.044 0.004 0.001
Reserves (% of GDP) 0.000 0.283 0.000 0.869 0.009 0.027
Public debt (% of GDP) 0.026 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.026
Current account balance (% of GDP) 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.020 0.002 0.114
Notes: Values shown are diagonal elements of matrix of predictor variable weights that minimise pre-FCL RMSPE (i.e., matrix
V in equation (9)). Composition of full and regional donor pools as presented in Appendix Table A5. Variables as defined in
Section 4.2.2.
Table A7: Predictor variable weights in capital inflow synthetic controls
Synthetic controls
Mexico Colombia Poland
Variables Full Regional Full Regional Full Regional
4-quarter gross capital inflows (% of GDP) 0.147 1.000 1.000 0.422 0.067 0.981
Real GDP growth (%) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.069 0.003 0.004
Capital account openness index 0.853 0.000 0.000 0.302 0.000 0.000
Overall country risk rating 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.206 0.930 0.015
Notes: Values shown are diagonal elements of matrix of predictor variable weights that minimises pre-FCL RMSPE (i.e., matrix V in
equation (9)). Composition of full and regional donor pools as presented in Appendix Table A5. Variables as defined in Section 4.2.2.
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